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FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

THE SUDAN

PART 3

January to December 1958

CONFIDENTIAL

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FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE RESPECTING
THE SUDAN—PART 3

JS 1011/1

No. 1

SUDAN: ANNUAL REVIEW FOR 1957

Sir Edwin Chapman-Andrews to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received January 23)(No. 5. Confidential) *Khartoum,*
Sir, *January 17, 1958.*

I have the honour to transmit herewith my Annual Report for 1957.

The independence of the Sudan was declared on the 1st of January, 1956. The last day of 1957 therefore neatly concludes the second year. The two periods of twelve months could hardly have been more different. 1956 was a year of uncertainty within and without, yet of great activity. There were stirring events: the "Black Hole of Kosti," the removal of Azhari from power and the hectic days of Suez. The past year, by contrast, has been one of quiet. Egypt's star has declined. Britain is again the most trusted and respected amongst the Sudan's foreign friends. In Parliament, the Prime Minister, Abdullah Khalil, has pursued his way quietly and firmly. No parliamentarian himself, though a firm believer in parliamentary democracy, he so contrived matters that Parliament sat during only twenty-eight working days throughout the year. The State of Emergency declared during Suez was not lifted until the 12th of May. At the end of June the date of the new general elections, the first in an independent Sudan, was fixed for the 27th of February, 1958, and Parliament was dissolved.

The 1958 Elections

2. The new Constituency Bill, based on the 1956 census, though expected to give a lot of trouble, was duly passed with little opposition. The census itself revealed a total population of 10½ million. Of this figure, the three southern provinces together totalled 2 million, Khartoum half a million, and the most populous province—the Blue Nile—2 million. The all-party Constitutional Committee has laboured conscientiously. The general elections are to produce a Constituent Assembly

which shall formally adopt a permanent constitution. The Assembly will then sit as a Legislature. This may seem strange doctrine to the constitutional purist, but it is common sense in the Sudan. The Constitutional Committee considered "Federation" for the South and rejected it (though it will remain a live issue in Parliament). An "Islamic Republic" to which both the Sayeds and the Grand Kadi gave public support has also been rejected; and towards the end of the year a proposal that the Headship of the new State should be vested in a Triumvirate also failed. The committee came down in favour of a single President. On this point, both Azhari's representative and the Umma were in agreement. This may mean that these two parties, which between them will control the great majority in the new Parliament, have agreed to make a straight fight of it for the Presidency and let the best man win. But despite talk about "clean hands" and appeals by the two Sayeds to "keep the peace," public security (or rather the Mahdi's nerves) will be under considerable strain if, on the count, Azhari should seem to have won.

3. So far, there has been surprisingly little excitement about the elections. This is not apathy but rather the Sudanese way of not getting excited until you have to. There have been hints in the Press and a certain amount of talk about foreign intervention in the elections, meaning financial aid for one party or another, but Britain has not been accused nor, so far as I know, even under suspicion. We are being meticulously careful not to take sides, even by implication. Azhari, with two or three of his henchmen, went off in January, 1957, on what one of his principal supporters described in private conversation as a "begging mission" to Egypt. This is popularly believed to have failed, if its object was indeed to raise election funds. Nevertheless, I believe that the Egyptians (irrigation

officials, teachers, merchants and embassy staff) are the paymasters of the Russians and that money will change hands in an effort to defeat the Umma.

Public Security

4. A small group of army officers and senior cadets, inspired doubtless by the Egyptian revolution, plotted amateurishly to overthrow the Government. Half a dozen of the ring-leaders were sent to prison. On the civil side, successful swoops were made on a Communist printing press and other nuclei of subversive activity. The Egyptians too were warned off. Their "Cultural Clubs" were cleaned up and their military attaché kept under close surveillance, the Prime Minister going so far as to tell the Egyptian Ambassador in April (and to repeat it afterwards to Gamal Abdel Nasser himself in Cairo) that, unless Egyptian interference in Sudanese domestic affairs ceased forthwith, the Sudan Government would feel obliged to break off diplomatic relations with Egypt. Coming only five months after a lengthy secret debate in the Sudanese Parliament on an Azhari motion to break off diplomatic relations with Britain (a debate which the Government won only because it had prudently bought all bribable southerners in the House of Representatives a few days beforehand), this fairly reflects the measure of our recovery from Suez and of the Egyptian partial eclipse. The Egyptians, taking too much for granted, had overplayed an excellent hand. Of this, we reaped the advantage.

The Armed Forces

5. In November, the Air Wing, composed of four Provosts and four Egyptian hedge-hoppers, with a total complement of eight Sudanese officers (who had received their initial training in Egypt and more advanced training in the United Kingdom), lost half its officer strength and two of its Provosts in a crash while landing at Torit in Equatoria. This misfortune came only a few days after the Prime Minister had made a personal appeal to Sir Hubert Patch, Commander-in-Chief of the Middle East Air Forces, for a Royal Air Force officer to be seconded to organise flying training and aircraft maintenance.

Foreign Aid Generally

6. Britain has been unable to furnish more than a few of the doctors, nurses, teachers, mechanics and foremen the Sudan needs

and has asked for. We have, however, put up a candidate for the important post of Industrial Adviser. Also we are at short notice trying to find a chairman for the three-man "Civil Service Cadre Commission." The fact that we, and we alone, have been asked to fill these important public posts, and furnish a Royal Air Force officer for the Air Wing, is further proof, if such were needed, of our recovery since Suez.

7. The Sudanese—both Government and private interests—have also asked that more British capital be invested here. To these appeals we have, for obvious reasons, had to respond unhelpfully for the most part, but Her Majesty's Government was able to agree to release £15 millions sterling from the Egyptian sterling balances as cover for the new Sudanese currency which was issued on the 8th of April. This decision was welcomed throughout the country. It has helped greatly to restore our position. More recently, the decision known only to members of the Sudan Government and to senior officials, to grant exchange control approval for the bank transfer of an additional £3 millions to facilitate transactions arising from the tardy sale of last year's cotton crop, has further strengthened Sudanese goodwill towards us, for it has relieved them of a good deal of anxiety at the turn of the year over the rapid run-down of their foreign currency reserves.

8. The Sudan is certainly in great need of foreign technical and economic aid. The Prime Minister himself, and his party in the Coalition, welcomed Mr. Richards and would gladly have accepted "Eisenhower Aid," but three People's Democratic Party (P.D.P.) members of his team refused to budge. Their attitude was dictated not by party considerations (for other P.D.P. Ministers, when the matter was put to the vote in Cabinet, showed hands with the Umma), but by Egypt. This was a timely reminder of the fundamental weakness of the Coalition and gave us a clear insight into the structural weakness of the P.D.P. The Prime Minister had either to sack the three dissidents (which he was itching to do) and reveal to the general public a split in the united front (and that on an issue which divided the whole Arab world) or to keep them and bow to their will. He wisely chose the latter. Aid without strings was another matter, however, and the whole Government welcomed the International Co-operation Administration Mission and the International Bank Mission at the end of the

year. The purpose of the latter was strictly to assess the credit-worthiness of the Sudan, but there are great expectations here as a result.

9. Tempting offers of economic aid, of engineering contracts, of trade agreements with the Communist bloc, have without exception been politely, tardily, but definitely rejected. But so long as the West cannot fulfil the Sudan's requirements of professional and technical experts, whether of doctors, engineers, teachers or what not, there will remain a real danger that the Communists will be drawn into the picture. Already far too many Communist bloc offers of "scholarships" for technical trainees abroad have been accepted, and there have been too many youth visits to Communist countries, but the Prime Minister has told me he will "put this right" after the elections.

Development and Contracts

10. Work on the first phase of the Managil Extension (which, when completed, will double the cotton-growing potential of the Gezira) is proceeding rapidly, months ahead of schedule, despite frequently heard complaints against the American heavy excavating machines which the Sudanese stipulated should be used. The German contractors complain that they have been put to heavy expense through the delays involved by the breaking of these machines and obtaining the necessary spare parts by air freight from America. German efforts to discharge the contract ahead of time are generally believed to show their determination to win other engineering contracts in this country. They will, for example, be very well placed for the construction of the £25-million Roseires Dam, not to mention the £20 millions' worth of contracts to complete the remaining three phases of Managil. In addition, they hope to be employed for the installation of hydro-electric works at Roseires and elsewhere, for the construction and working of a cement factory near Khartoum, ginning factories all over the cotton-growing areas, and any railway extension work going, including the supply of rolling-stock for work on the extension at Port Sudan and possibly, in the not distant future, on the construction of a new airport for Khartoum. A British firm, however, has managed to get the contract for constructing three new quays at Port Sudan and we are supplying as much of the new railway rolling-stock as we can

provide before the delivery date quoted. The Germans are not going to have it all their own way over hydro-electric power, despite the fact that Mirghani Hamza, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Irrigation, seems to be pretty well in their pocket. This year has made it clear that the Germans are our most serious competitors and that if British firms want these contracts and top-ranking people at home are prepared to come out to the Sudan, determined to get them even if it means enduring the Khartoum climate for two or three weeks, we shall undoubtedly be able to do more than merely hold our own. We shall, however, have to show fight, as the Germans do, and not merely sit back as we could safely do in the Sudan years ago and wait for the business to come our way in its own good time.

11. The Sudan's need of capital for development has been further shown by agreements to establish a number of new banks. These include the Agriculture Bank of Iraq, the Ethiopian State Bank and a Saudi Bank. The National Bank of Egypt, now that Sudanese currency has been introduced to replace Egyptian Bank notes, is gradually closing down.

Cotton

12. This is the subject which during the year has caused us greatest anxiety. In a good year, the crop is worth over £50 millions. As the main source of the country's wealth, cotton comes into everything. It was not surprising, therefore, that, when the bumper 1956-57 cotton crop remained almost entirely unsold six months after the date by which in normal years all cotton has been cleared, the repercussions were felt throughout the country. This was due to the ill-advised sales policy of the masterful Managing Director of the Sudan Gezira Board, Mekki Abbas. He had calculated that, with the Egyptian market virtually closed, Lancashire could be made to pay his price. But when Abdullah Khalil, following his visit to London in September, realised the truth of the situation, he returned to Khartoum determined to grasp the nettle even if it meant getting rid of Mekki Abbas. Cotton prices were reduced, at first tentatively and insufficiently, and finally, through slashing the export tax by half, drastically. This led at once to the desired result and cotton sales boomed for the next five or six weeks. By the end of the year there still remained a substantial

carry-over of unsold cotton, much of it having suffered country damage through exposure in the open to the tropical rain. But the back of the problem had been broken. Foreign exchange had begun, though slowly, to come in and, equally important, buoyancy had replaced the atmosphere of pessimism which had pervaded the country in September. The influence of this change on Umma election prospects was naturally favourable.

Economic

13. During the year, the Sudan's reserves of foreign currency (other than Egyptian) fell from about £33 millions to about £8 millions. This was due to two main factors: failure to sell cotton and planned expenditure on development. Subsidiary factors were traffic jams at Port Sudan and along the railway bottle-neck, caused by the accumulation of imports and exports resulting from first the closure and then the reopening of the Suez Canal (when goods arrived from both directions). By the end of the year order began to be restored. The general economic situation, therefore, is not as bad as the foreign currency reserve figures might lead one to suppose.

Conclusion

14. My conclusion is that 1957 has been a pretty good year for us in our relations with this country. Our stock again stands high. We have done our best to help the Sudanese in their need and they acknowledge it. My previous thirty years' service in the Middle East had led me to the conclusion that the man who said there was no such thing as gratitude in international relations was right. Two years here, however, have shaken me in this view. By and large, the Sudanese are grateful to Britain not only for what we have done for them during the past year but also for what hundreds of individual Englishmen did for this country during the past fifty years. Our position here has throughout the year also been greatly helped by the fact that a true friend of our country, Abdullah Khalil, has been at the head of the Government and that he has the Mahdi behind him. But the Umma have not been strong enough in Parliament to govern alone and their coalition partner, though the weakest of the three main parties, has on more than one occasion called the tune. A split in the coalition between the two Sayeds would have meant more votes for Azhari. Yet

events have shown that the P.D.P. is not only the smallest but the least united of the three parties and Sayed Ali's control over the P.D.P. party leaders is tenuous even if it exists at all. A virtual certainty is that, even if the Umma beat the National Unionist Party (N.U.P.) in the elections, they will still have to form a coalition of some sort to remain in power. It would be unwise to prophesy further at present. If, on the other hand, the N.U.P. should emerge with an absolute majority, a tense situation may arise. The Mahdi still aspires to become Head of State. He could command at short notice sufficient force to take Khartoum. He would undoubtedly be tempted to do this rather than submit to Azhari. Ten or even five years ago he would not have hesitated. But during the past twelve months he has aged considerably. Abdullah Khalil is ageing too. Yet if one or the other should disappear there would be confusion in the ranks of the Umma. If both should go, there might be despair, for the Prime Minister has no obvious successor in his own party, and the Mahdi's son, Siddiq, cannot count for certain on the united support of party, tribesmen and religious devotees. The Umma's fortunes and therefore the immediate future of the Sudan turn upon how the Mahdi and Abdullah Khalil weather the next few months. So far as Britain is concerned and British relations, not only with the Sudan but also to some extent with the countries on its borders in East and Central Africa (not to mention Egypt), the brief period immediately ahead is, in my judgment, of greater significance than any similar one since the days of Fashoda.

I have, &c.

E. A. CHAPMAN-ANDREWS.

Enclosure

Chronological Order of Events, 1957

January

- 1 Independence Day. First anniversary.
- 5 Azhari calls for withdrawal of deposits from British banks and says he would accept Soviet arms.
- 13 Azhari and Zarroug visit Cairo to "congratulate the Egyptian people."
- 17 Sudanese Ambassador arrives in Paris and presents credentials after three-month delay as show of disapproval of French Algerian policy.
- 18 Contract for Managil extension awarded to West German contractors.

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January

- 19 First Sudanese coins put into circulation. Council of Ministers decide nomenclature "Republic of the Sudan," not Sudanese Republic.

February

- 13 Ministry of Education Conference with Directors of Mission Schools to discuss take-over by Government as from April 1. Government announces elections will be postponed until October or November.
- 25 Brief conference in Khartoum between Prime Minister and Head of American International Co-operation Administration.

March

- 3 Re-assembly of Parliament on May 13 announced.
- 5 Appointment of Electoral Commission announced by Supreme Commission.
- 10 Statement on American aid. Government continuing to study offer.
- 13 Vice-President Nixon in Khartoum for 24 hours.
- 14 Government warn Left-wing agitators of the consequences of misbehaviour.
- 19 Departure of Prime Minister for visit to Riyadh, Baghdad, Kuwait, Damascus, Amman, Beirut and Cairo.

April

- 1 Departure of Her Majesty's Ambassador on three weeks' tour of the South.
- 8 New Sudanese currency notes issued.
- 9 Prime Minister returns from Cairo having persuaded the Egyptian Government to agree to transfer of sterling securities to the value of £20 millions nominal as cover for the new currency.
- 11 Her Majesty's Government agree to transfer by Egypt out of frozen sterling balances of £15 millions to Sudan for currency redemption. Minister of Finance publicly thanks Her Majesty's Government.
- 16 Chinese Workers' Delegation arrives.
- 17 Government announces that visits of foreign delegations and of Sudanese delegations to foreign countries must in future be organised through diplomatic channels.
- 20 Mr. Richards, Eisenhower's personal envoy, arrives in Khartoum. Sudan Government announces postponement of any decision on acceptance of United States' aid.
- 22 Prime Minister visits Ethiopia.

May

- 12 State of Emergency lifted, having been in force since Suez crisis.
- 13 Parliament reassembles.
- 17 Formation of new political party announced by descendants of the Khalifa Abdullahi.
- 23 Civil Aviation Agreement between Ethiopia and Sudan announced.
- 30 Gambeila Protocol between Sudan and Ethiopia ratified by Sudan.

June

- 1 Gezira Board announce return to auctions after period of private treaty sales. Price reductions, but still small sales.
- 6 Elections Bill passed in Parliament.
- 11 Ethiopian Trade Delegation visits Khartoum.
- 13 Several officers and N.C.Os of Sudan Army arrested after discovery of subversive movement.
- 13 Purchase by USSR of 9,000 bales of cotton through a local firm.
- 18 Queen's Birthday celebrated. Supreme Commission attend reception given by Her Majesty's Ambassador.
- 18 Iraqi Trade Delegation representing the Iraqi Loans Bank arrives in Khartoum.
- 26 Electoral Commission begins work.
- 27 House of Representatives rises.
- 30 Senate rises. Parliament dissolved.

July

- 1 Supreme Commission announces that new elections will be held on February 27, 1958.
- 8 Sudan Government announces that permission would not be granted to the Sudan Youth Organisation to visit Moscow for International Youth Festival.
- 12 Political refugees from French Cameroons arrive and are permitted to remain.
- 12 Visit of Pandit Nehru.
- 14 Chinese Communist Trade Delegation arrives.
- 26 Visit of Secretary-General of Arab League, Abdel Khaliq Hassouna.
- 27 Four Provost aircraft arrive piloted by British ferry pilots. First planes for new Sudan Air Wing.
- 30 Sudanese Foreign Minister visits Greece at invitation of the Greek Government.
- 31 Sudanese Boy Scouts leave for Boy Scouts' Jamboree in the United Kingdom, their expenses paid by the Sudan Government.

August

- 7 Deportees from Cameroons hold Press Conference in Khartoum.
- 10 Arrival of members of Algerian Liberation Front.
- 25 Delegation from Ghana visits Sudan.
- 31 Sudanese Prime Minister leaves for United Kingdom.

September

- 5 Sudan joins International Monetary Fund and International Bank.
- 10 Delegation of Gezira Tenants leaves for Moscow.

October

- 2 Sudan elected to Economic and Social Council of United Nations.
- 14 Saudi Arabian Economic Mission arrives.
- 16 Arrival of Comet III in Khartoum, after record-breaking flight from London.
- 18 Buganda Minister of Natural Resources visits Sudan.
- 20 Payments Agreement between the Sudan and Saudi Arabia renewed.
- 28 Visit of Commander-in-Chief, Middle East Air Forces.
- 30 Arrival of International Co-operation Administration Mission for four weeks.

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October

- 31 Ethiopian Ambassador issues statement reaffirming Ethiopia's claims to Nile Waters.

November

- 1 Commissioner of Khartoum bans street processions for one month.
3 Two Sudanese military aircraft crash and four of the eight pilots in the Air Wing killed.
16 Reduction of reserve cotton prices and export tax. Revival of competitive bidding at Gezira auctions.
27 Visit of delegation from World Bank.
30 Initialling of draft Air Services Agreement between the United Kingdom and the Sudan.

December

- 4 Constitutional Commission recommends that the Head of State should be a single President instead of a Commission as at present.
6 Sudanese Delegation leaves for Cairo to take part in Nile Waters negotiations with Egypt.
7 Israel Boycott Office set up in Khartoum.
8 Arrival of delegation from Somalia.
8 Sudanese Trade Delegation leaves Khartoum for India, China and Japan.
10 Sudanese Prime Minister leaves for visit to Nigeria.
14 Extension of import licensing announced.
24 Elections to Executive Committee of the Railway Workers' Trade Union concluded. Leftists win large majority.

JS 1015/6

No. 2

THE SUDANESE ELECTIONS AND AFTER

Sir Edwin Chapman-Andrews to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received January 30)

(No. 10. Secret)

Khartoum,

January 24, 1958.

Sir,
Mr. Watson's letter to Mr. Bailey (JS 1015/72) of the 1st of January called attention to two articles published in *The Economist* of the 7th and 14th of December entitled "Sudanese Sects and Politics". In this despatch I have the honour to comment upon these articles.

The Problem

2. Their central thesis may be summarised as follows:

- (a) The influence of the two Sayeds has declined and will continue to do so;
(b) The best Government for the Sudan after the elections would be an Umma-N.U.P. coalition.

An Assumption

3. The assumption underlying (b) must be that neither the Umma nor the N.U.P. will emerge from the elections with an absolute majority, or very substantially stronger than the other, and therefore that the country will have to be governed by some sort of coalition. Is this assumption reasonable?

Election Forecast

4. In the first place, both the Umma and the National Unionist Party leaders seem genuinely confident that their respective party will defeat the other decisively and secure an absolute majority, but shrewd observers reckon that the result will probably lie somewhere half-way between the two extremes. This forecast, though not founded upon an arithmetical projection from the results of the last elections in 1953, does, in fact, closely conform to such statistical calculations. The new Assembly of 173 members will be composed as to 46 of Southerners. Of these latter, some will run as straight Umma or straight N.U.P. candidates, though their party loyalty after the elections cannot, for various reasons, be taken for granted. An average guess would be that, apart altogether from the 46 Southerners, the Umma will, of the remaining 127 seats, get 56, the N.U.P. 51 and the People's Democratic Party (P.D.P.) 20. To the Umma strength I think we might add, say, 9 Southerners elected on an Umma ticket and to the N.U.P., say, 3 making a total of:

Umma	...	...	...	...	65
N.U.P.	...	...	...	...	54
P.D.P.	...	...	...	...	20
Uncommitted Southerners	...	...	...	...	34

If this forecast should prove to be anywhere near right it is clear that the Umma leaders would be called upon to try and form a Government, which they could succeed in doing only by a coalition. With the P.D.P. alone, they might not succeed in obtaining even a bare majority. They would then have to resort to the usual methods of securing support from a number of the uncommitted Southerners. In coalition with the N.U.P., however, they would have a clear majority over all others. That is the argument *a priori* in favour of an Umma-N.U.P. coalition.

The Sayeds in Decline?

5. May I now turn for a moment to the statement in paragraph 2 (a) above. Is sectarian influence on the wane? The influence of Sayed Ali Mirghani (S.A.M.) has undoubtedly declined, though history shows how deceptive an apparent Khatmia decline may be; but there are few signs of any present weakening of the influence of Sayed Abdel Rahman El Mahdi (S.A.R.). Nevertheless, both these holy men are admittedly aged; their heirs-apparent will not inherit their personal influence; and finally the political significance and, possibly, the religious appeal

of Islamic sectarianism in the Sudan may be expected to diminish in future. But the tacit assumption in the articles that the speed of this process will inevitably be rapid is, in my judgment, unsound. Much will depend on events. An Umma-N.U.P. coalition, for example, would almost certainly increase the pace, just as the Khatmia-Ashigga coalition before the 1953 elections speeded the decline of S.A.M.'s influence. The younger generation among the more politically minded of S.A.M.'s supporters then voted for Azhari with the blessing of their own religious leader. I think they will vote the same way tomorrow even without it. S.A.R.'s influence, on the other hand, has been subject to no such structural weakening, and his word is still pretty well law with about half the population of this country; 40 per cent, anyway. And the central political fact in the existing state of affairs in the Sudan, as opposed to probabilities in the future, is that S.A.R. believes he could physically seize power if he so desired. In my judgment, he could, in fact, do so; and I think the great majority of Sudanese, of whatever party, would admit this, if only to themselves, as true. Hence, logically, the Egyptian and Communist first limited objective, namely "to weaken the Umma". Their policies cannot make headway unless the Umma-Ansar power is either broken in a trial of physical strength or relegated to the role of ineffective parliamentary opposition. Such a role for the Umma appeals also to the bitter hard core of the Khatmia, whose feelings, incidentally, are fully reciprocated by the bitter hard core of the Umma. And although the individuals composing these two cores are not numerous, the fact that they exist and exercise some influence is itself a factor in the slowly diminishing power of the two Sayeds.

An Umma-N.U.P. Coalition?

6. Regarding the proposition in paragraph 2 (b) above, the idea of an Umma-N.U.P. coalition has for some time been the hobby horse of Mohamed Ahmed Umar, who has been touting it round discreetly, not only here but also in London and Paris. (He seems to have convinced my French colleague.) His motives may perhaps be distrusted. He certainly belongs to the hard bitter core of the Umma referred to above. But he is also venal and I think he may be acting in collusion with the N.U.P. organiser, Yahia el Fadli, who is clever and unprincipled. These two may be planning to feather their own nests during the first fine careless rapture of absolute power which such a coalition would command; but whether or not these suspicions are well founded, the idea of such a coalition at first blush has much to recommend it.

The Pros

7.—(a) The P.D.P. as a whole have proved unreliable partners in Government. Their President and Secretary, who are members of the Government, have always been in close touch with Egypt and are now manoeuvring in their constituencies for Communist support. One or two other P.D.P. Ministers have, in recent months, been edging away from them towards the Umma. It is doubtful whether S.A.M. is still capable of exercising real authority over the group as a whole. Even if he were, the group would still be by far the weakest of the three main parties. It might, therefore, be argued that the Sudan would have a stronger Government without it and this, in turn, would mean an Umma-N.U.P. coalition.

(b) Secondly, such a coalition would be administratively advantageous. It would combine talents. Umma Ministers have, on the whole, not been good departmental political chiefs. Too often they have lacked moral courage.

(c) Finally, in our dealings with such a coalition we should appear to be on the side of the angels, for the Government would seem to combine the best of the old traditional régimes with the best of the new popular ones. To counterbalance the decline in the influence of the Sayeds, we should have a stake in the future; as against the authoritarianism and religious fanaticism of the Ansar, we should have a stake in the schools and university and in the streets of the main towns.

The Cons

8.—(a) There arise, however, other considerations. At least two of the P.D.P. Ministers, Abu Sinn (Social Affairs) and Amin El Sayed (Health), have been excellent heads of their respective departments, and are reliable from the British point of view. If a coalition to combine the talents, why not "all the talents"?

(b) Coalition Governments do combine talents; but through lack of parliamentary opposition they are not always desirable. In the Sudan, taking into account the present phase in the development of democratic institutions, it is at least arguable that an effective two-party system would be more healthy. There would be no such system under an Umma-N.U.P. coalition, besides which,

(c) as a result, even the good P.D.P. members would find themselves in bad company; for the small ineffectual parliamentary opposition would naturally tend to close its ranks and, being small and ineffective, seek support wherever it could find it. The P.D.P. President and Secretary would claim that their pre-election exchanges with the Communists were justifiable and timely. I should hope that the better elements in their party would wish to join up with the coalition and be welcomed within it, but I fear that S.A.M. would feel that he had been badly let down and would exercise what remained of his influence against it.

(d) Finally, such a coalition would probably not last very long. The Umma represents the countryside with its tribes, traditions and religious nationalism, the private cotton estates with their landowners and dependent labour. The N.U.P. on the other hand represents the proletariat in the towns and larger villages, junior officials, students and the half-educated generally. Their leaders seek the way back to power. Straight Umma policies would be frustrated in Cabinet while the N.U.P. leaders treated with other political groups and by one means or another replenished the party funds. No doubt all those interested in "weakening the Umma" would help in this process. Then, at a convenient opportunity, probably on an issue of foreign politics which divided the Arab world, or one which caused concern to Western interests, the split would come. It would be found that the support of the majority of the uncommitted Southerners had been bought and that only a coalition formed by the N.U.P. could command a parliamentary majority. The Umma would be forced into opposition and unlikely to get back into power so long as the N.U.P. funds could keep the uncommitted Southerners on their side. This coincides with what we suspect to be both N.U.P. and Egyptian election strategy, namely, not to spend much money on the elections themselves, certainly none on the South, but to reserve their funds for buying support where they can in the next Chamber.

9. Such a situation could conceivably tempt the Umma leaders to resort to undemocratic methods. But unless they struck at once the parties in power would soon ensure by judicious transfers, retirements and appointments that the chances of a successful *coup* were minimised. The resultant Government might be a "popular" one but we know from experience that "popular" parties rely upon popular demonstrations in the streets to show their strength and that their leaders have no choice but to follow the town crowds.

Back to the Sayeds

10. But all this speculation adds up to very little if, in fact, the two Sayeds have formally agreed to stand together, come what may. I believe such to be the case. During recent weeks I have from time to time discreetly sounded reliable individuals on this subject. On the Sudanese side all, without exception, have come down in favour of the two Sayeds remaining together after the elections. Some close to S.A.R. have told me that now he has put his hand in that of S.A.M. it would be shameful for him to turn his back upon him and that he would not even consider doing so. Certainly both the Sayeds have no reason to trust Azhari. He was carried to power last time on the Khatmia vote, then, in order to keep his seat, he turned his coat at the opportune moment, thus offending not only S.A.M. but also S.A.R., whose thunder for independence he stole. The two old gentlemen will not easily forgive him.

The Presidency

11. It remains doubtful, however, whether agreement between the two Sayeds has gone so far as to include the future Presidency of the Republic. S.A.R. believes that S.A.M. will no longer object to the Umma nomination which would undoubtedly be that of S.A.R. himself. I too am inclined to think that if he were compelled to choose between Azhari and S.A.R., S.A.M. would choose the latter, though he would prefer to seek a third course. An Umma-N.U.P. coalition, assuming (as I think would be most unsound) that S.A.R. agreed to it, could only be after agreement about the Presidency and the Premiership. Assuming that

S.A.R. still wanted the Presidency, this would mean a coalition Government under Azhari; and I cannot see the Umma leaders accepting that. Assuming on the other hand that S.A.R. could be persuaded to stand down (which I doubt) I cannot see him doing so in favour of Azhari.

Conclusion

12. My conclusion, therefore, is that whatever the idea of an Umma-N.U.P. coalition may have to recommend it, and however unsatisfactory the continuation after the elections of the existing coalition may be, there is little chance of an Umma-N.U.P. coalition coming off. This, I must emphasise again, is always on the assumption that the Umma will emerge from the elections slightly stronger than the N.U.P. If it should be the other way round, the chances of an N.U.P.-Umma coalition might be greater, as the Umma politicians might prefer to keep their foot in the door rather than go into opposition. In that case I should expect S.A.R. to be President and Azhari Prime Minister. As against this is the risk that S.A.R. would take the law into his own hands. If such intentions are already formed, the secret is locked in his own heart. All we can do is await the result of the elections to be declared on the 10th of March.

I have, &c.

E. A. CHAPMAN-ANDREWS.

JS 1015/17

No. 3

THE SUDANESE ELECTIONS

Sir Edwin Chapman-Andrews to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received February 27)

(No. 19. Confidential) Khartoum,
Sir, February 17, 1958.

Under cover of my P.L. No. 15 of the 24th of January, I transmitted the texts of the official proclamations announcing the dates of the opening of the Sudanese Parliament following the forthcoming general election. I have already reported in detail on various aspects of the forthcoming contest and I now have the honour to set out below a brief account of the electoral system and of the declarations of policy made by the various parties. I trust this may be of use as a background against which the results may be assessed.

2. When on the 27th of February the Sudanese electors go to the polls, it will be for the first time in an independent Sudan. The Parliament they are to elect will serve also as a Constituent Assembly which is to prepare a Constitution to replace the present Transitional Constitution.

3. Polling is by universal adult male suffrage. 173 seats are to be filled in the House of Representatives. 30 of the 50 seats in the Senate are to be elected by male electors of over 30 years of age. The remaining 20 Senators will be appointed by the Supreme Commission of 5 which, under the Transitional Constitution, acts as the Presidency of the Republic. These 20 Senators will not, however, participate in the drafting of the Constitution. Candidates for the House must be 30 years of age, literate, and free from the customary impediments, such as insanity and imprisonment for not less than two years in the last seven years. Members of the Senate must be 40 years of age, literate, except in the case of certain constituencies in the South, and also free of the customary impediments.

4. Owing to the immense size of this country (it is about the same area as present-day India), and the lack of communications in the tribal grazing areas, and in parts of the South, the results will not be announced until the 10th of March. Parliament is to meet on the 19th of March to elect its speaker and again on the 20th of March to elect a Prime Minister. It will then take a short recess before reassembling as a

Constituent Assembly. The life of the Parliament is three years, unless previously dissolved.

5. The last day for the submission of nominations was the 26th of January, and the last day for withdrawal without loss of deposit was the 31st of January. It now appears that in all the names of about 660 candidates will appear on the final official list of nominations, when it is published. The courts have had occasion, in accordance with the Constitution, to examine the legal status of a number of prospective candidates against whom their opponents have alleged there is a legal bar. At Kosti the National Liberation Party opponent of the Prime Minister alleged that he could not legally stand for Parliament because he was an alien, and because the nomination was not made through the prescribed legal channels. The Prime Minister's father was, in fact, an Egyptian national and his mother was a pure Sudanese of the Ta'isha tribe. Sayed Abdullah himself was born in Omdurman in 1892. The court decided that since all persons born in the Sudan before 1898, whatever their origin, were *ipso facto* Sudanese, the Prime Minister's candidature was valid. The court also decided that the correct channels had been used. This is now reported to be the subject of an appeal to the Chief Justice. The Prime Minister counter-attacked by alleging that his opponent had been of unsound mind. However, he later withdrew his objection to his opponent's candidature. His agent said this was "to make the N.U.P. savour the bitterness of defeat." A number of candidates have been ruled out by the courts on grounds of illiteracy. In places where this might occur, the parties prepared for this contingency by appointing several candidates as independents who could become the official candidates should the need arise. The situation now is that both the coalition (Umma and the People's Democratic Party (P.D.P.)), and the National Unionist Party (N.U.P.) have nominated candidates for almost all the 127 northern constituencies and for some of the 46 southern constituencies.

6. Although the parties fighting the election have published programmes, it would, I think, be true to say that, in general, party allegiances depend more on personalities and the family background of the individual elector than on his attraction to a philosophy or policy of government. The exceptions are the Communists, members of the Anti-Imperialist Front, Moslem Brothers and some of the half-educated.

7. The main parties are as follows:—

(a) The Coalition

(i) *Umma Party*.—This party essentially consists of the supporters of Sayed Abdel Rahman el Mahdi. It is strongest in the western areas of the Sudan away from the River Nile or on the Nile in the area of Aba Island where the Mahdi first preached his crusade. The Umma Party prides itself that it has all along stood for the independence of the Sudan, that for the eighteen months it has been in power it has administered the country well, has kept the Sudan out of international disputes and maintained peace within the country. Somewhat belatedly it issued a statement on foreign policy to counter that issued by the N.U.P. Its policy is defined as one of complete neutrality between the West and East, belief in parliamentary democracy and opposition to Communism. They stand also for "cordial respect" for neighbouring African countries and for co-operation among the Arab countries provided this is free from interference in each other's internal affairs. This emphasis on independence was pointed by the Prime Minister when on the 13th of February, commenting to the Press on the United Arab Republic, he said: "There is no question of the Sudan joining, but, of course, we want good relations with Egypt."

(ii) *People's Democratic Party*.—This party is composed basically of the members of the Khatmia, the followers of Sayed Ali El Mirghani. For many years the two Sayeds were at loggerheads but in the face of pressure from the anti-sectarian parties they finally drew together in the present coalition. The P.D.P. is strongest among the older generation of riverain peoples and the Red Sea littoral, who, because of easy communications with Egypt, are both orthodox Moslems and tend to look to Egypt for leadership. During the Mahdiya, many of them fled to Egypt and returned with Kitchener's Anglo-Egyptian Army. Recently the party has tended to split into two factions. The one led by the president

of the party, Sayed Ali Abdurrahman, who is also the Minister of the Interior in the present coalition Government, is completely sold out to Egypt and ready to make overtures to the Communists. This has caused a good deal of concern to the Umma Party and made the alliance an uneasy one. The other faction, led by Sayed Mohamed Ahmed Abu Sinn, the Minister for Social Affairs, and official Government spokesman, is more inclined towards the Umma. Sayed Abu Sinn makes no attempt to hide his dislike of Egypt and the Egyptians. There has been a dispute between the two parties as to who should fight certain constituencies, both sides putting up rival candidates. As a result, three-cornered fights were likely to develop in some constituencies, thereby splitting the coalition vote and endangering its chances of success. After many meetings between representatives of the two parties—even including two meetings between the Sayeds themselves—this now appears to have been resolved in almost all constituencies in dispute. A notable exception is Dongola South, where the Secretary-General of the Umma Party and Minister without Portfolio, Sayed Amin El Tom, is standing against Sayed Amin El Sayed, Minister of Health. Here, too, there is also an N.U.P. candidate.

(b) The Opposition

(i) *National Unionist Party*.—This is the party of the supporters of Sayed Ismail El Azhari, who was Prime Minister from January 1954 to July 1956, when he was unseated through the withdrawal of the P.D.P. and Umma Party from his National Government. The greatest strength of the N.U.P. lies in the towns and amongst the younger generations of riverain peoples. It also finds support among the half-educated and in the schools and colleges, especially those run by the Egyptians. It is anti-sectarian. Sayed Ismail El Azhari's extensive election promises include:—

- (1) Reversion to small tenants of private estates in the irrigated areas on expiry of existing leases.
- (2) Gezira tenants to receive an increased share of the profits.
- (3) All workers' demands to be met without discussion.
- (4) The police and army to be doubled, and their pay to be increased.

Sayed Yahia el Fadli has even gone so far as to say that an N.U.P. Government

would distribute land owned by "feudalists" to the farmers' co-operatives. The N.U.P.'s foreign policy has been summarised by Azhari as follows:—

1. A defence pact with Egypt.
2. Abstention from military pacts with the Great Powers.
3. Support for the principles of Bandung.
4. Economic and cultural co-operation with the "liberated" Arab countries.
5. Positive neutrality.

(ii) *Anti-Imperialist Front*.—The Anti-Imperialist Front consists of crypto-Communists. In the last election they secured one seat. They do not expect to obtain many seats in the new House but aim at selling their support to either N.U.P. or P.D.P. candidates where it will most suit their aim of breaking down the strength of the Umma Party. Their attitude to both the N.U.P. and P.D.P. is conditioned by the fact that in these two parties there are members, such as Sayed Mubarak Zarroug in the N.U.P. and Sayed Mohamed Abu Sinn in the P.D.P., whom they dislike for being too friendly to the West. It is announced that the A.I.F.'s first objective is for the Sudan to join the new United Arab Republic. In general its tactics are pro-Egyptian and anti-Umma.

(iii) *National Liberation Party* (Ta'isha Party).—This party was founded in 1957 by some of the sons of the Khalifa Abdullahi. It is strongest in some of the tribal areas dominated by the Umma. It appears to have had some Egyptian encouragement, and its policy approximates to that of the N.U.P. But its electoral significance is not thought to be great.

(c) The South

(i) *Southern Liberal Party*.—This party was founded in 1954 and stands for federation between North and South. It is split into two factions. That led by Stanislaus Pysama was formerly pro-Egyptian but has recently made overtures to the Umma. Secondly, there is the Benjamin Lwoki faction. Lwoki is Minister of Works in the present coalition Government, but the venality of its leader makes the attachment of this group to the coalition inevitably a matter of some doubt.

(ii) *The Federal Party*.—This new party is a splinter group from the Southern Liberal Party and is led by E. M. Gwonga. Its allegiance has not been declared.

8. No clear picture of the likely outcome of the elections can be given, though I have recorded my guess of the results in my despatch No. 10 of the 24th of January. I would emphasise, if I may, that this is indeed merely a guess, which might prove as wrong as some guesses about the result of the post-war election in England. No one, not even the leaders of the two main parties, can be sure of the result of these, the first general parliamentary elections to be held in the Sudan, genuine democratic elections with all safeguards and a secret ballot. This is the real test of public opinion. The situation is that of the 126 northern seats, most of the seats in the west are safe for the Umma Party. In the towns and in most constituencies along the river, the N.U.P. will certainly be in the majority. A few seats along the northern reaches of the Nile, and a number in the Red Sea area should go to the P.D.P. It is in the Blue Nile Province (the Gezira Scheme) that the main electoral battle will be fought. The probability as regards the northern seats is that neither the N.U.P. nor the Umma will have an absolute majority in the House, but that, as before, a small P.D.P. group will hold the balance between them. But however the results in the North turn out, the final balancing element will be the South. The South consists of a heterogeneous collection of tribes which elect impecunious and generally de-tribalised politicians. They find themselves impoverished in Khartoum and are, therefore, open to the highest bidder. This then remains the great imponderable, for whoever has their support will probably be able to command a majority in the Chamber.

9. The Sudanese security forces are being stretched to a maximum. The Sudanese Army consists only of 14,000 men, and in what is generally a law-abiding country the police forces also are small. It is generally considered that there is no potential danger to public security until polling day itself. Even then the chances of disorders are thought to be small. The main risk of trouble will come when the results begin to be known before they are publicly announced. If the Umma Party are the losers a resort to arms by the Ansar is by no means impossible, in which case we should be faced with a situation far more serious than that which arose on the 1st of March, 1954, when the spears of the Ansar were raised in Khartoum. The fact that Sayed Abdulla Khalil, the present Umma Prime

Minister and a strong man, will remain in power until either his re-election or the election of his successor on the 20th of March, should provide an assurance against violence on the part of the Ansar at least until that date. Equally the possibility of rioting by the anti-sectarian rabble in the towns cannot be excluded should the Umma prove victorious, though the security forces should be able to control any disorders of this kind.

10. The Sudanese are proud of being a parliamentary democracy and there have been strong appeals from the political leaders and the chairman of the Election Commission to be orderly. Indeed, the Sudan is one of the few parliamentary

democracies left in the Arab world and the Sudanese will undoubtedly be under close scrutiny from the peoples of the Middle East and Africa to see if they have the maturity to live up to the high standard of discipline which such a system demands.

11. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Addis Ababa, Amman, Ankara, Baghdad, Beirut and Tripoli; to the Political Officer with the Middle East Forces, and to their Excellencies the Governors of Kenya and Uganda.

I have, &c.

R. W. BAILEY.

(For the Ambassador.)

ZP 3/6

No. 4

THE FUTURE ORIENTATION OF THE SUDAN

[This paper has been produced by the Foreign Office organisation, described in Foreign Office Circular No. 068 of August 1, 1957, for the utilisation of intelligence and forward planning.]

Summary

The new Sudanese Parliament will be responsible for passing a new Constitution. A period of great political activity is ahead. (paragraph 1)

2. The Umma and the P.D.P. are "sectarian" parties, in that they consist largely of the followers of Sayed Abd el Rahman (S.A.R.) and Sayed Ali el Mirghani (S.A.M.) respectively. S.A.R. is traditionally friendly to Britain, S.A.M. has stronger links with Egypt. The National Unionist Party (N.U.P.), the "middle-class," non-sectarian party of former Prime Minister Azhari, originated as a pro-Egyptian group, but came to support an independence policy when it was in power. The Southern politicians, non-Arab and non-Muslim, are too disunited and inexperienced to carry much weight. (paragraphs 2-10)

3. Cotton is the foundation of the Sudan's economy, which is in a moderately healthy state. Efforts to make her less dependent on this one crop are not progressing fast. The waters of the Nile are as vital to the Sudan as to Egypt and if they were unable to obtain their fair share by agreement the Sudanese would not hesitate to appropriate it. (paragraphs 11-12)

4. The main external threat to the Sudan is Egypt, whose aim remains the unity of the Nile valley. President Nasser views the Sudan as a channel of further penetration into Africa. The Egyptians have unrivalled cultural and intellectual leadership in the Sudan. The Sudanese have reacted cautiously to the United Arab Republic. Arab unity has great appeal to the Northerners, but this by no means implies willingness to accept Egyptian domination. (paragraphs 13-15)

5. International Communism is trying to capture the youth, the intelligentsia and the working-class. The seeds have been widely sown, but it is doubtful whether they will grow very fast. Despite low living standards, social conditions do not provide fertile ground for Communism; moreover the Government have taken measures to suppress its growth. The Sudan is unlikely to wish to move closer to the Soviet Union, but she might be tempted to do so if she saw no other profitable way of disposing of her cotton crop. (paragraphs 16-17)

6. Internal stability is good at present, but might at any time be threatened by discontent in the South or amongst the Ansar, the tribal devotees of S.A.R. Moreover, the army, though at present an efficient force, might in the future be the victim of personal and political dissensions. (paragraphs 18-19)

7. The significance of these elements of instability will vary in inverse proportion to the effectiveness of the Administration and of the parliamentary system. Both have made a promising start. For the present the two great religious orders will moderate the speed of social change; "sectarianism," however, must be expected to decline with the spread of education, a decline which will be accelerated by the deaths of the two religious leaders. (paragraphs 20-22)

8. Britain has strategic, economic and political interests in the Sudan. Our political interest is partly negative, to keep the Sudan out of the grasp of Cairo or Moscow and to preserve her as a buffer State between the Arab and African worlds; partly positive, to maintain a stable Sudan, both as an enduring advertisement of the benefits of British administration and as a healthy example of democratic government to other emergent African States. (paragraphs 23-25)

9. If the speed of social change becomes the main political issue of the future, it could provide the basis for a well-balanced two-party system. If the N.U.P. can maintain their unity, they are likely to emerge ultimately as the strongest political group. They would not be as well-disposed to Britain as the Umma and their foreign policy would be less reliable. On the other hand we need not expect them

to be hostile provided we can convince them that we are not unsympathetic to them nor trying to interfere in internal affairs.

10. There is a good prospect of a stable Sudan and of friendly relations with any foreseeable Sudanese Government so long as:—

- (a) representative government continues to flourish
- (b) Sudanese cotton finds an adequate outlet in the Western world.

(paragraphs 26-27)

A.—Introduction

The 1958 general elections in the Sudan were the second in her history. In addition to its normal legislative duties, the new Parliament will be called upon to pass a Constitution to replace the present interim Constitution. The elections therefore herald a period of great political activity.

2. The first general elections in December 1953 resulted in a victory for the National Unionist Party (N.U.P.), led by Ismail el Azhari, which was an alliance of his own Party, the Ashigga ("blood-brothers"), whose main plank was the unity of the Nile valley, and the supporters of the great Khatmia religious order headed by Sayed el Mirghani (S.A.M.). The Umma Party, which stood for Sudanese independence and was composed largely of the followers of the rival religious leader, Sayed Abd el Rahman el Mahdi (S.A.R.), only obtained 22 seats in a House of 97. After the attainment of independence in 1956, however, the supporters of S.A.M. broke with Azhari, formed a new Party called the People's Democratic Party (P.D.P.) and allied themselves with the Umma to form a Coalition Government under the Premiership of the Secretary-General of the Umma, Abdullah Khalil.

B.—The Main Political Groups

The Umma

3. The Umma, meaning "nation" or "people," was formed in 1945 under the patronage of S.A.R. and its President and Treasurer is his son, Sayed Siddiq El Mahdi. It derives most of its finance from S.A.R.'s huge estates and most of its political strength from the traditional followers of the family of the Mahdi, known as the Ansar. Geographically its main strength lies in the Provinces of Darfur, Kordofan and Blue Nile, which between them embrace about 40 per cent. of the population of the Sudan. Working with the Umma are a few independent politicians such as Ibrahim Ahmed and Judge Shingeiti. The Foreign Minister, Mohammed Ahmed Mahjoub, has only recently joined the Party and is neither liked nor trusted by the majority. In view of its traditions and its leadership the Umma Party is essentially conservative, but in its election platform it has shown a genuine awareness of the Sudan's need for social progress.

4. In foreign policy the Umma Party is historically suspicious of Egyptian intentions and has considerable confidence in the United Kingdom. It has not openly changed Sudanese foreign policy but there has been a marked shift of emphasis since it came into office. The welcome it gave to the new United Arab Republic was distinctly lukewarm. Abdullah Khalil has made special efforts to draw the Sudan closer not only to Britain but to Saudi Arabia, Ethiopia and Iraq; and his visit to Nigeria was an outward sign of his strong conviction that the Sudan's destiny lies as much with the African as with the Arab world. He has made it clear that the Sudanese policy of non-alignment in world politics extends to non-alignment also within the divided Arab League. Whilst openly expressing the Sudan's support of Egypt during the Suez struggle, he did all he could to damp down anti-British sentiment. He refused Egyptian demands for an immediate bilateral agreement over the division of Nile waters. After long negotiation, he secured a financial agreement with Egypt which, with the consent of the United Kingdom Government, provided for the release of £15 millions from the blocked Egyptian sterling balances as cover for a new Sudanese currency; this enabled him to go ahead with plans for the repatriation of Egyptian bank notes. In February 1958 he refused to be intimidated by Egyptian provocation on the 22nd parallel. The election results represent a victory for his firm independent policy.

The P.D.P.

5. The P.D.P. comprise mainly the followers of S.A.M., and their traditional strongholds are the Northern and Kassala Provinces. During the Mahdi's revolt and the Dervish Empire many of the leaders of the Khatmia took refuge in Egypt. The emergence of S.A.R. as a result of his support for Britain in the first world war and the great wealth that he then amassed from cotton-growing led to bitter and continuing rivalry between the two Sayeds; this was one of the prime factors in Sudanese politics between the two world wars and only began to slacken, after the British withdrawal, in face of a threat to both of them from Azhari and the N.U.P.

6. Both traditionally and as a consequence of their hostility to S.A.R. the Khatmia have been friendly to Egypt. This friendship has not been destroyed by their alliance with the Umma in the present coalition Government, although a number of prominent members of the Party are out of sympathy with Egypt. This division within the P.D.P. was also evident when President Eisenhower's envoy arrived in the Sudan in April 1957. On that occasion three of the six P.D.P. members of the Cabinet were opposed to the acceptance of United States aid; in this stand they had the backing of S.A.M. and of the Egyptians. Only two of these six were successful at the elections, one from each group.

The N.U.P.

7. The N.U.P. is a "middle class" Party, which embraces most of those people in the Northern Sudan who feel no allegiance to the religious leaders. It came to power in 1953 in alliance with the Khatmia but since the break in this alliance its policies have been becoming steadily more "anti-sectarian." It is generally stronger in the towns than in the countryside. It is difficult to speak in general terms of N.U.P. policy because its leadership comprises men of varied outlook and calibre. Azhari himself is a political opportunist by instinct. Yehia el Fadli is not only an opportunist but also corrupt. The best man among them is Mubarak Zarroug, who made an efficient Foreign Minister in Azhari's Government and is a man of balanced views. The rank and file are an unimpressive collection of ambitious politicians.

8. The N.U.P. originated as a pro-Egyptian group and during the first part of their period in office endeavoured to give some concrete meaning to their platform. Since their *volte face* over independence the Egyptians have ceased to support them, but they continue to be more favourably inclined towards Egypt than are the Umma. They have recently advocated a military alliance with Egypt and they sent an enthusiastic telegram of congratulations to President Nasser on the creation of the United Arab Republic; on the other hand they joined the general chorus of disapproval when Egypt tried to conduct her plebiscite in the areas of the Sudan to the North of the 22nd parallel. They are more extreme than the Umma in their condemnation of "colonialism."

The South

9. The three Southern Provinces of the Sudan, Upper Nile, Bahr el Ghazal and Equatoria, have never been a Moslem area; to the primitive tribesmen of the South, Islam has traditionally meant the slave-trader and the merchant from the North. Christian Missions have worked in the South since 1905, but have not touched the majority of the people, who have remained pagan, primitive and poor. Most of the handful of politically conscious southerners are the product of the Mission Schools, now taken over by Government but still run by the Missions. They are not impressive intellectually nor distinguished by any great sense of responsibility. In the last Parliament the Southerners scarcely deserved to be called a political group, because they were so lacking in a sense of solidarity and so unstable in their loyalties. All Southerners want the South to play a greater part in Sudanese affairs but they have produced few constructive ideas for achieving this. Although the South is in no position to run its own affairs, most Southern politicians feel bound to claim that the South should have a Federal relationship to the North, a claim which may cause difficulties during the drafting of the new Constitution. With 46 seats out of an Assembly of 173 and two guaranteed seats in any Government, the Southerners could, if they were united, exercise a considerable influence over events.

10. Because of their non-Muslim background and the trust and affection that the Southerners have always felt for the British, their feelings in foreign affairs are

broadly anti-Egyptian and pro-Western; but their disunity, and their inexperience, deprive them of any real share in the formulation of foreign policy.

C.—The Economy

11. Considering its lack of raw materials and sources of power, the Sudan is remarkably prosperous. The National Debt is under £10 millions, against which there is a currency backing of some £15 millions and a reserve of foreign currency (other than Egyptian) which, though considerably run down by the demands of development and the tardy sale of the cotton crop, stood at the end of 1957 around £10 millions. The balance of trade fluctuates considerably, largely in line with cotton production and sales. Attempts are being made both to introduce greater variety into agricultural production and to encourage industrialisation and mineral exploitation, but these cannot for many years affect the predominance of cotton. Indeed the development projects which are now in hand, such as the Managil extension scheme in the Gezira and the Roseires Dam on the Blue Nile will, when completed, tilt the balance even further towards cotton.

12. The waters of the Nile are the life-line of the Sudan no less than of Egypt. However attractive the romantic view of the great Nile uniting the peoples who rely upon it, the Nile in fact seems destined to remain a constant cause of dispute and division. Despite great feats of engineering and careful planning for further development, there is likely to be a shortage of water during the dry season for a long time to come. The division of the available water will be a bone of contention between the interested parties, and especially between the Sudan and Egypt; the chances of a compromise being found and enshrined in a new Nile Waters Agreement seem slender at present. The Sudanese feel sufficiently strongly on this issue to be ready to appropriate any extra water they need if they find themselves unable to obtain their fair share by negotiation.

D.—Threats to the Sudan's Stability

Egypt

13. The country's independence and present stability are exposed to both external and internal threats. The main external threat is that of Egypt. The independence of the Sudan was a defeat for Egypt's policy of union between the two countries. The Egyptians still aim at achieving unity of the Nile valley and therefore have irredentist feelings towards the Sudan, which they can scarcely now express. They also view the Sudan as a channel of further penetration into Africa. Colonel Nasser says in his "Philosophy of the Revolution": "the boundaries of our beloved brother the Sudan extend far into the depths of Africa, bringing into contiguity the politically sensitive regions of that area." Egypt's cultural leadership in the Arab world is unrivalled and her present Government exploits it to the full in pursuit of political aims. Egyptian teachers are sent to the Sudan; Sudanese teachers are trained in Egypt. Egyptian propaganda is energetically spread abroad in books and pamphlets and by Radio Cairo. The Egyptians make full use of the venality of the Sudanese Press.

14. The ideal of Arab unity has a great appeal to the Northern Sudanese, but this by no means implies willingness to accept Egyptian domination. When Egypt is threatened, as during the Suez incident, the Sudan feels bound to rally to her support, short of war; when Egypt sponsors a conference, the Sudan feels bound to attend. The Sudan shares the general Arab hostility towards Israel, but not the more violent emotions which result from having a common frontier with her. The creation of the United Arab Republic came as something of a surprise to the Sudan and has strengthened Egypt's claim to be in the forefront of the movement for Arab unity. Reactions in the Sudan, however, show a shrewd inclination to watch developments. Both the P.D.P. and the N.U.P. sent enthusiastic telegrams of congratulation to President Nasser, but only the Anti-Imperialist Front (Communist) has advocated Sudanese membership. There is as yet no significant movement of public opinion in the Sudan in favour of joining the Republic. The events of 1955, when the Sudan was approaching the stage of self-determination, showed that the Sudanese public are fundamentally suspicious of Egypt and instinctively prefer the idea of national independence; the same sensitiveness has been clearly revealed by the Sudanese reaction to President Nasser's provocation on the 22nd parallel.

15. If Egypt wished to invade the Sudan, her armed strength would be sufficient, at any rate on paper, to penetrate some distance up the Nile valley and probably to occupy Port Sudan. They would certainly meet with most determined resistance both from the armed forces and from bands of armed tribesmen, especially the Ansar. The Sudanese do not regard Egyptian invasion, however, as a serious possibility. Their political and military leaders have scant respect for Egyptian military prowess and seem to assume that if the Sudan were invaded the West would come to her aid.

The Soviet Union

16. The Soviet Union has a large Embassy in Khartoum and there are Missions also from other Satellite countries. Through the Front Organisations, international Communism is trying to capture the support of the youth, the intelligentsia and the working class. Several hundred Sudanese have visited Communist countries at the invitation of their Governments and of Communist organisations. At least two daily Arabic newspapers take the Communist line. The strongest of the Sudanese Trade Unions has recently elected pro-Communists to a majority of its principal offices; this is the Railway Workers' Union, which, since it covers railway, river, hotel and catering services, has a position of some importance in a country which depends almost exclusively on rail and river communications. The Gezira Tenants' Association, a rich and vocal body, is also infected. There are four Communists out of a University Student's Council of twelve members. Thus the seeds have been widely sown, but it is doubtful whether they will grow very fast; despite the generally low standard of living, social conditions in the Sudan are not such as to promote widespread interest in the practical side of Communism and educational standards limit the number of Sudanese who can understand the theory of it. Moreover, the Government have taken measures to suppress the growth of Communism. The Communist Party is banned, although its substitute, the Anti-Imperialist Front, is allowed to function. The Government did their best in 1957 to prevent Sudanese students from attending the Moscow Youth Conference and to punish those who went. They have also recently amended Trade Union legislation in a deliberate attempt to weaken the Communist-dominated Sudan Workers' Federation of Trade Unions (S.W.F.T.U.).

17. The Sudanese, whilst paying lip-service to anti-colonialism, have no deep-seated grudge against the West; indeed appreciation of the benefits derived from British administration lives on. They have no reason at present to want to move closer politically to the Soviet Union. Economically, however, they are more exposed, as was shown in 1957 by the Soviet offer to purchase the Sudanese cotton crop as a barter deal. This offer has been pressed, but the Sudan Government has preferred to lower the reserve prices in order to sell the crop on the open market. Not being members of G.A.T.T., they are free to enter into discriminatory bilateral deals; there is a dangerous possibility that if the West's demand for cotton were to fall away they might decide to sell the bulk of their crop to the Soviet and Satellite market on terms prejudicial to their political freedom of action. Similarly they might be tempted to turn to the East if the cotton crop were to fail badly and the West were to reject a request for financial help.

Internal threats

18. Most of the elements of internal instability have already been touched on; for example, the South, where in 1955 a mutiny in the Equatoria Corps of the Sudan Defence Force led to widespread riots involving the death of at least 250 Northerners; the Ansar, the tribal devotees of S.A.R.; the Press, which is irresponsible even by Middle Eastern standards, and the University, where apart from the Communists on the Student's Council there are also six members of the Muslim Brotherhood.

19. The history of the Arab countries since the first world war shows that the Army, despite its role as guardian of internal security, is also a political factor of some importance. The Army in the Sudan is British trained and has largely maintained its traditions and its discipline; nevertheless there are certain dangers which need to be noted. First, there are a few senior officers who might be tempted to intervene in politics if they were offered an opening; second, there is a possibility of division inside the Army as the result of different religious and political loyalties; third, there is a risk that irresponsible junior officers, inspired by the example of Colonel Nasser, might try to stage a *coup* in order to gain control

of the Army. The third is the most dangerous possibility. During 1957 an amateurish plot was unearthed amongst a small number of young officers and cadets; in itself this was not serious, but it provided confirmation of a dangerous rift between junior and senior officers.

E.—Stabilising Factors

20. The significance of these elements of instability in the Sudan will vary in inverse proportion to the effectiveness both of the administration and of the parliamentary system. So long, for instance, as there is a strong and alert Prime Minister, the Army and Police can be expected to function in their proper roles as the guardians of law and order. So long as there are free elections and political parties representative of the varying loyalties and opinions in the country, no sudden growth of Communism need be feared.

21. The Sudan Civil Service works with fair efficiency despite the haste with which the Azhari Government pursued the policy of Sudanisation and the subsequent departure both of foreign administrators and technicians. The Sudanese Parliament has settled down to its duties with dignity and efficiency and the majority of Ministers have shown some sense of responsibility. In general therefore the Sudan enjoys a Government as honest and effective as any in the Middle East.

22. The system of government allows scope for great social and economic changes, and as education spreads these changes will inevitably come. But the speed of change will be moderated by the two great social religious influences which underpin the structure of society in the Northern Sudan; the Mahdiya, which still possesses the physical reinforcement of the armed Ansar tribesmen, and the Khatmia. The hold which these two great religious orders have on their followers is undoubtedly on the decline, but the rate of decline will probably not be rapid initially. For the present therefore, sectarianism may be regarded as a strong force favouring evolution as opposed to revolution. S.A.R. is now well over 70 however and S.A.M. is over 80; it is almost inevitable that the influence of sectarianism will decrease rapidly when they die.

F.—British Interests

23. We have strategic, economic and political interests in the Sudan. Strategically, the Sudan is one of the great cross-roads of Africa. She sits astride one of the main air routes to the Persian Gulf and the Far East and the main land and air approach to tropical Africa from Europe. She also has a 400-mile frontier with Uganda and Kenya.

24. Economically, the United Kingdom exports annually more to the Sudan, and imports more from her, than any other country; our trade with the Sudan is at present worth a total of some £25 millions and India's is worth some £14 millions per annum. Khartoum Airport also provides the main staging post for commercial air routes from Europe to British East and Central Africa.

25. Politically, our interest is partly negative, to keep the Sudan out of the grasp of Cairo or Moscow, and to preserve her as a buffer State between the Arab and African worlds; and partly positive, to maintain a stable Sudan, both as an enduring advertisement of the benefits of British administration and as a healthy example of democratic Government to other emergent African States.

26. The argument in this paper suggests that the best chance of stability for the Sudan lies in the consolidation of her present system of representative government, since it gives scope to almost all shades of opinion and permits gradual social change. From this point of view the present alliance between the Umma and the P.D.P. is a logical one, since the followers of each party come mainly from the conservative sections of the population, especially in the countryside. It is true that the two religious leaders have only come together from common opposition to the N.U.P.; there is still no great mutual confidence and a genuine danger exists that when the new Parliament starts consideration of the choice of a President for the Sudan the old rivalry will be rekindled. But, however tempting an alliance with the N.U.P. may be for the attainment of an immediate political objective, each of the two leaders probably realises that it would be short-lived and as damaging to their future position as was S.A.M.'s previous support for

Azhari. If the speed of social change becomes the important political issue of the future, it is likely to lead to a contest between the conservatives and the N.U.P., and thus to provide the basis for a well-balanced two-party system.

27. As education spreads in the Sudan there is likely to be an increase in anti-sectarianism, and the N.U.P., if it can maintain its unity, is therefore likely to emerge as the strongest political group. We can scarcely hope for relationships with the N.U.P. as cordial as those we have with the Umma. Apart from their more pronounced anti-colonial position in foreign affairs, the N.U.P. would feel less compunction than the Umma in exploiting public feeling on foreign issues in order to distract attention from difficulties at home. Moreover they would be more easily tempted to lend their support to a Nationalist movement in British East Africa and to risk the unsettling effect which instability there might have on the Southern Sudan. It would be wrong however to paint too gloomy a picture of the prospects of another N.U.P. Government. When they were in office they showed a moderate sense of responsibility and despite pressure from Egypt continued to maintain a friendly relationship with the United Kingdom. There is no reason to expect different treatment from a future N.U.P. Government so long as we can convince them that we are not unsympathetic to them nor trying to interfere in their internal affairs. There is, indeed, a good prospect of a stable Sudan and of friendly relations with any foreseeable Sudanese Government so long as: (a) representative government continues to flourish; and (b) Sudanese cotton finds an adequate outlet in the Western world.

Africa Section,

Research Department.

JS 1015/43

No. 5

THE SUDANESE GENERAL ELECTIONS AND THE RESULTING POLITICAL SITUATION

Sir Edwin Chapman-Andrews to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received April 12)

(No. 39. Confidential) *Khartoum,*
Sir, *April 10, 1958.*

I have the honour in this despatch to offer some observations on the recent General Parliamentary Elections and on the resulting political situation.

2. In my despatch No. 10 of the 24th January, I described the political scene before the elections and attempted a general forecast of the result. In my despatch No. 19 of the 17th February, I gave an account of the state of the parties, their different policies and of the electoral machinery which had been set up. In subsequent telegrams, I reported the results as they appeared; the opening of Parliament; the election of the new Speaker; the re-election of Abdullah Khalil as Prime Minister (in accordance with the Transitional Constitution still in force); the adjournment of Parliament at the beginning of Ramadan; and the formation, some days later, of the new Government. There is now a lull. The Sudan sleeps by day in the torpor of Ramadan; public offices open late and close early; the hot weather has set in with unwelcome haste and social life is at a low ebb. This is therefore not an unsuitable moment for stocktaking.

3. The elections themselves were conducted with praiseworthy discipline and calm between the 27th February and the 10th March. In the towns, an 80 per cent. poll was not uncommon. In outlying districts, particularly the forests and swamps of the south, the figures were naturally lower (and, to be honest, we must face the fact that General Parliamentary Elections mean nothing to the more primitive inhabitants of such regions). In Khartoum, citizens exercised their franchise as a matter of duty. The army, everywhere on the alert, were nowhere in evidence; and the police constable, steel-helmeted as a precaution and as a reminder, good-humouredly kept the populace moving along (assemblies were forbidden by proclamation) and protected the queues of voters outside the booths against attempts by sundry individuals to address or interfere with them. For security reasons, the poll was staggered throughout

the country, but at the end of each voting day the sealed ballot boxes were transported to the respective provincial capitals and there kept under guard until the 16th March, the day of the count.

4. For all this, the Electoral Commission, which had learnt its business in 1953 under British auspices, deserves full marks.

5. At half-hourly intervals throughout the count, Radio Omdurman, alternately in English and Arabic, dispassionately announced the results as they came in, giving only the name, profession and constituency of each elected candidate. Listeners had to keep their own score, which many did on the newspaper charts, working out their own figures of how the parties stood. The party colour of most northern candidates was known beforehand, but such was by no means the case in the south. The party system is well-established here, but party organisation, judged by United Kingdom standards, leaves much to be desired. Even when all the results were known, the leaders of the three great northern parties, namely the Umma, the N.U.P. and the P.D.P., could not be sure within 5 per cent. how they stood. This margin was of particular importance because the Umma/P.D.P. Coalition needed eighty-seven seats to be sure of the minimum majority; and by midnight on the 16th March, as I reckoned it, this was exactly what they had, namely 62 Umma and 25 P.D.P. Far too close for comfort as this was, it nevertheless represented a clear defeat for the N.U.P., whose 44 seats compared ill with Azhari's boastful claims a week earlier that he was sure of anything between 115 and 135. Another certainty was that the Communists, in the shape of the Anti-Imperialist Front, had had a severe set-back, their President, a Member of the old House, actually losing his deposit. They did not win a single seat, though later one man, whom everyone had thought to be P.D.P., declared for the Front. Other interesting facts were that all the Umma and N.U.P. leaders were returned and all, or nearly all, the P.D.P. leaders defeated. The reason for this is undoubtedly S.A.M.'s

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stance that these leaders should stand for their former constituencies in Khartoum, where in 1953 they were carried home on the shoulders of the N.U.P. Their defeat at the price the P.D.P. had to pay for making with the Ashigga in June 1956. S.A.M., however, is a cunning old gentleman and I have no doubt that he knew exactly what he was doing. By acting as he did, he succeeded in two things:—

- a) deflating people like Ali Abdel Rahman, who had got somewhat out of hand; and then
- b) by nominating them for the Senate and for Government office, retaining his party's authority in the Cabinet without losing a single vote in the Lower House.

Despite Azhari's boasting, the N.U.P. leaders no doubt felt the chill before the result of the poll was declared, for they tried off, one to each of the three southern provincial capitals. This move could be for one purpose only, namely to "persuade" attached southerners to support the

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three northern parties that a southern bloc had been formed.

7. With the knowledge that the south was more united than ever before and that there were thorny questions with Egypt to be settled, including the frontier and the division of Nile Waters, the leaders of the Umma and the N.U.P., the two strongest northern parties, who together could count upon 106 supporters excluding southerners altogether, secretly explored together the possibility of forming a united front. Unfortunately perhaps, these efforts broke upon the uncompromising refusal of S.A.M. to join up with the N.U.P. There was no need for him to remind S.A.R. of the bond between the two. S.A.R. is a man of honour and he at once agreed to S.A.M.'s suggestion to make a public statement, asserting that rumours of disagreement between them were unfounded and that they would continue to stand together for the good of the Sudan. In a sense, this is sound policy, from the point of view of the two Sayeds, for unless they do stand together they will the sooner fall separately, or at least their influence (and sectarianism generally) will the more rapidly diminish; but as against this it is also true that they are both, by Sudanese standards, very advanced in years; that sectarianism is almost bound in the course of nature to become less powerful in the Sudan as with the spread of education the youth of the country join in ever-increasing numbers the ranks of their like throughout the world. For the time being, however, the last word was with the two Sayeds. There was to be no immediate Coalition with the N.U.P.

8. But, apart from this, on the morning of the 20th March, no one could say for certain exactly what would happen. As the Members of the new house of Representatives assembled, it was observed that the Umma and the P.D.P. moved in to the right of the Speaker's Chair, while the N.U.P. gathered in the two front benches to the left. Some twenty-five southerners, nearly all very tall and thin, nearly all very young looking and all wearing brand new suits and gaudy ties, formed a compact group in the two rows behind the N.U.P. The Clerk of the House in loud tones called the House to order and read the summons from the Supreme Commission. In attendance stood the Sergeant at Arms, a splendid figure with his sword and sky-blue uniform and his rows of medals. Sayed Mohamed Saleh Shingeiti, though not a Member, was

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- (a) deflating people like Ali Abdel Rahman, who had got somewhat out of hand; and then
- (b) by nominating them for the Senate and for Government office, retaining his party's authority in the Cabinet without losing a single vote in the Lower House.

6. Despite Azhari's boasting, the N.U.P. leaders no doubt felt the chill before the result of the poll was declared, for they hurried off, one to each of the three southern provincial capitals. This move could be for one purpose only, namely to "persuade" unattached southerners to support the N.U.P. in Parliament. The President of the P.D.P. was already in the south and reports reached us of his disbursements, which were believed by many to have been made with Egyptian funds. The Umma had for long been courting the south, chiefly by "doing good," such as providing medical attention and the free distribution of medicines, from a stern-wheeler supplied for the purpose by the Mahdi. The Umma had, moreover, all along been counting on a number of southerners who had supported them in the last Parliament and whom, in return, the party were supporting meanwhile. Of these, 11 were returned to Parliament. This made it virtually certain that to the 62 safe Umma men elected in the north, at least 10 or 11 southerners would be added "on the day," making over 70 hands for the Umma. The P.D.P. could count on 25 northerners plus a few, very few, southerners. The N.U.P. seemed at once to realise that with only 44 seats they were out of the running. They made no further effort in the south. Simultaneously, it was rumoured that Stanislaus Paysama, a practising Roman Catholic, a southern "federalist" and sometime Minister, had succeeded in binding by a secret oath the majority of the 46 southerners to vote solidly together in the new Parliament when any question affecting the south was involved; and before Parliament met on the 20th March it was clear to the leaders of all

three northern parties that a southern bloc had been formed.

7. With the knowledge that the south was more united than ever before and that there were thorny questions with Egypt to be settled, including the frontier and the division of Nile Waters, the leaders of the Umma and the N.U.P., the two strongest northern parties, who together could count upon 106 supporters excluding southerners altogether, secretly explored together the possibility of forming a united front. Unfortunately perhaps, these efforts broke upon the uncompromising refusal of S.A.M. to join up with the N.U.P. There was no need for him to remind S.A.R. of the bond between the two. S.A.R. is a man of honour and he at once agreed to S.A.M.'s suggestion to make a public statement, asserting that rumours of disagreement between them were unfounded and that they would continue to stand together for the good of the Sudan. In a sense, this is sound policy, from the point of view of the two Sayeds, for unless they do stand together they will the sooner fall separately, or at least their influence (and sectarianism generally) will the more rapidly diminish; but as against this it is also true that they are both, by Sudanese standards, very advanced in years; that sectarianism is almost bound in the course of nature to become less powerful in the Sudan as with the spread of education the youth of the country join in ever-increasing numbers the ranks of their like throughout the world. For the time being, however, the last word was with the two Sayeds. There was to be no immediate Coalition with the N.U.P.

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unanimously elected Speaker. After he had taken his oath of office, the Members were sworn in, six at a time, on the Koran or the Bible, in Arabic or English. Then came the election of the Prime Minister. Three names were put forward: Stanislaus Paysama, Ismail El Azhari and Abdullah Khalil. Voting was by ballot papers, collected together by the Clerk of the House, each vote being solemnly set down in the Record. Despite the foregone conclusion, these moments were not without drama and suspense. Finally the Speaker announced the election of Abdullah Khalil with 103 votes against Azhari's 44 and Paysama's 25. A cheer from the public gallery was promptly suppressed. The conventional allocutions were then made by the new Prime Minister, by Mubarek Zarroug as leader of the Opposition, and by Mohamed Ahmed Mahjoub as leader of the House.

9. These proceedings, though formal, nevertheless revealed two significant features. One was the emergence of a southern candidate for the Premiership in opposition to both Coalition and N.U.P. This was intended to be, and was taken as, formal notice that the south has a case which it means to press, irrespective of northern alignments and interests. It reminds one of the formation of Parnell's Home Rule Party during the closing years of the 19th Century. The second was the general tone, rather than the actual content, of the conventional speeches from the leaders of Government and Opposition. Both without doubt left the door open, if only slightly, to future collaboration. It is noteworthy in this respect that no P.D.P. leader spoke. The House of Representatives then adjourned *sine die*, the intention being that Parliament should reassemble at a date to be fixed after the four-day festival which comes at the end of the month of Ramadan.

10. Next came the question of the Senate. The Senate election results, announced on the 14th of March, gave the Umma 14 of the 30 elected seats, the P.D.P. and N.U.P. 5 each, and the southerners 6. The remaining 20 seats, to be filled by nomination of the Supreme Commission, were, by custom, to be allocated in proportion to party strengths in the Lower House. After some difficulty, caused by the doubtful party allegiance of certain potential nominees, the complexion of the Senate finally emerged as follows: Umma 21; N.U.P. 10; P.D.P. 9; southerners 10. When it met on the 22nd of March, the Senate elected Amin

El Sayed of the P.D.P., formerly Minister of Health, to be its Speaker. It then also adjourned *sine die*.

11. With Ramadan ahead and the whole country rather tired of politics for the time being, the Prime Minister knew that he could safely take his time over choosing his Government. It had previously been agreed, after some argument, that the Umma should have 10 Cabinet seats including southerners and the P.D.P. 6. The difficulty arose over Ali Abdel Rahman. He had been defeated at the polls by a substantial majority; and the Prime Minister does not trust him. During his election campaign he did not scruple to try to attract the Communist vote. The Umma would not have him again as Minister of the Interior. S.A.M., however, urged on by a small but closely knit group of the P.D.P., would at first settle for no one else. Finally he had to give way. The office would continue to be held by a P.D.P. nominee, Mirghani Hamza, who would take it in addition to that of Minister of Irrigation and, incidentally, Deputy Prime Minister, and Ali Abdel Rahman would be Minister of Commerce, Industry, Supply and Agriculture. This left one P.D.P. Minister still to be appointed. There, for the time being, matters rest.

12. The new session, the most important one yet for the independent Sudan, promises also to be lively. The southern group in particular, if they hold together and steer clear of the temptations of life in the capital, particularly the pecuniary allurements which the N.U.P. may offer, ought to be able to go some way towards achieving their objectives, which are:—

- (a) eventual federation to be conceded in principle;
- (b) a measure of autonomy immediately; and
- (c) not a single President for the Sudan but a triumvirate including one southerner.

Abdullah Khalil's majority is not as safe as it looks. The Umma won the election by superior organisation. Transport is the answer to many problems in the Sudan and the Umma on this occasion had the right transport in the right place at the right time. The others had not; and they now know it. Nasser's blunder over the northern frontier also undoubtedly played into the Umma's hands. Nevertheless, if there had been a three-cornered fight throughout the country and the Umma organisation had

been no better than it was in 1953, the N.U.P. would undoubtedly have emerged as the strongest party. Their leaders claim that their party had more votes than the other two put together, due to the higher polls in the towns and larger villages, where the N.U.P. are strongest. The Opposition in Parliament is therefore still potentially strong. On the other hand, the "Azhari legend," his personal reputation for political sagacity and wise statesmanship, is now sadly tarnished as a result of his declared foreign policy of closer ties with Egypt and of his vain boasting about the election results. Azhari no longer stands where he did either in the country at large or in his own party, and it is believed that he has agreed to stand on one side if some sort of Northern Coalition should eventually emerge.

13. Such a Coalition is probably what the Umma and N.U.P. leaders are still quietly working toward. To succeed, the opposition of S.A.M. must be overcome. That can be done only, if at all, by the personal influence and persuasion of S.A.R. That at

once raises the burning question of the Presidency of the Republic, which in turn depends upon the articles of the Constitution which it is the first and foremost duty of the new Parliament, *qua* Constituent Assembly, to enact. The future, on all these points, cannot yet be clearly foreseen; but at least we can say that the Prime Minister of the Sudan, as a result of the recent elections, is at the head of the strongest single party in Parliament, that he is the most reliable man of them all from the Western point of view and that he may, with reasonable confidence, look forward to maintaining and possibly even strengthening his authority for some time ahead.

14. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Addis Ababa, Ankara, Baghdad, Beirut and Tripoli, to P.O.M.E.F. and to their Excellencies the Governors of Kenya and Uganda.

I have, &c.

E. A. CHAPMAN-ANDREWS.

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No. 6

DECLARATION OF POLICY IN NEW SUDANESE PARLIAMENT

Sir Edwin Chapman-Andrews to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received May 19)

(No. 50. Unclassified)

Khartoum,

Sir,

May 14, 1958.

I have the honour to report that the Second Parliament of the Republic of the Sudan opened the Second Sitting of its First Session on Monday, the 12th of May, 1958.

2. In the House of Representatives Sayed Mohammed Ahmed Mahgoub, in his capacity as Leader of the House, reiterated the Government's foreign policy of non-alignment with either the Eastern or Western blocs; neutrality vis-à-vis the Arab blocs; non-participation in military pacts "except as a defensive measure in case of aggression" on the Sudan; and of help to dependent African territories in the attainment of independence and a better standard of living. Referring to foreign aid, Sayed Mahgoub said that this was acceptable to the Sudan provided it did not interfere with the country's independence. The Government had decided to accept American aid, but they could not accept military aid, nor would they allow economic aid to develop into military aid.

3. In a general review of internal affairs, he said that the policy of the Government would be both to consolidate and to expand industry, agriculture, trade, commerce, the social services and the public utilities. In those fields, particular attention would be paid to the South and to other under-developed regions. He emphasised that the Government was determined to preserve peace, order and stability in the country, and for this purpose the security forces would be strengthened, and the maintenance of an uncorrupt Civil Service ensured.

4. Sayed Mahgoub also announced a number of specific projects to improve industry, agriculture and irrigation, and made the following announcements which are of particular interest:

- (a) The Government would introduce legislation for the imposition of an Income Tax and Stamp Duty, to match greater expenditure caused by increased social services and development projects.
- (b) It was hoped that negotiations would be resumed with the United Arab Republic about the distribution of the Nile Waters, and that a final and just agreement would be reached.
- (c) It had been decided to expand both the army and the air force, and to equip them with modern weapons. In addition a Staff College and a Topographical School in addition to the present Military College would be established.
- (d) Priority would be given to the establishment of textile and sugar industries.
- (e) A cotton marketing board would be established (my telegram No. 615 of the 12th of May refers).

5. Copies of the text of the speech are enclosed.⁽¹⁾ I am sending copies of this despatch without enclosure to Her Majesty's Representatives at Addis Ababa, Amman, Ankara, Baghdad, Beirut, Rabat, Tripoli, Tunis and Washington, to the Political Office, Middle East Forces, to the Political Office, British Forces Arabian Peninsula, to their Excellencies the Governors of Kenya and Uganda, to the Administrator of the East Africa High Commission and to the United Kingdom High Commissioner in Accra.

I have, &c.

E. A. CHAPMAN-ANDREWS.

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

CONFIDENTIAL

JS 1111/19

No. 7

THE SUDANESE BUDGET FOR THE FISCAL YEAR 1958-59

Sir Edwin Chapman-Andrews to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received June 9)

(No. 61 E. Confidential)

Khartoum,

Sir,

June 7, 1958.

I have the honour to report that the Sudanese Minister of Finance, Sayed Ibrahim Ahmed, introduced in the House of Representatives on the 29th of May the budget for the fiscal year 1958-59 which starts on the 1st of July next. I enclose copies of the budget, together with the Minister's speech and "The Finance Bill 1958".⁽¹⁾ An outline of the main proposals was given in my telegram No. 671 of the 30th of May.

2. In accordance with the practice established last year, an economic survey for 1957 had been prepared and distributed beforehand to members of the House. Copies of this document are not yet available, but I hope to transmit it later.

3. The Minister began with a brief reference to the economic conditions prevailing during the first few months of this year, a period not covered by the Economic Survey for 1957. He was able to report that from the beginning of the year to the 16th of May 196,000 bales of cotton had been shipped, compared with 83,000 bales in the same period of the previous year. In my view, the comparison is perhaps hardly a valid one, as at the beginning of 1957 the Sudan was not trying, as is the case this year, to dispose of a large carry over; but Sayed Ibrahim felt able to claim that the world statistical position of cotton is, on the whole, encouraging and that the prospects of disposal of the remaining 450,000 bales before the next season are "reasonable". Referring to trade generally during the first three months of 1958 (which are shown by published statistics to have run at a deficit of £S.2,729,634) Sayed Ibrahim pointed to a decrease in both exports and imports during this period compared with the same months last year and expressed the hope that recently imposed import controls would "reduce imports to a reasonable level".

4. Referring next to the budget estimates for the year 1957-58, the Minister stated that revised estimates now placed revenue receipts at £S.45,989,877 (an improvement of £S.404,462 over the £S.45,585,415 originally estimated) and expenditure at £S.40,188,019 (compared with the original estimate of £S.40,380,044), leaving a net unspent balance of £S.192,025. The 1957-58 Budget was thus, he said, expected to end with a surplus of £S.5,801,858 against the original estimate of £S.5,205,371.

5. Discussing the budgetary position for 1958-59, the Minister said that on the basis of existing taxation the anticipated revenue is put as £S.35,464,878. This was £S.10,524,999 less than the revised estimate for 1957-58, a reduction mainly accounted for by large decreases in cotton receipts and customs revenue. In face of this decrease in estimated revenue, the most stringent economy had had to be exercised by Departments in presenting their estimates for the coming year. Only the minimum essential provisions had been allowed, and estimated expenditure had in this way been held to £S.38,342,214. Even so, a deficit of £S.2,877,336 remained, which could not be eliminated without dislocating the essential fabric of existing services.

6. The Minister then went on to refer to some of the problems facing the Government as the result of the current adverse economic situation. The first of these was the estimated budgetary deficit: the first in the Sudan since 1932. Sayed Ibrahim explained that it had been decided that the country's uncommitted reserves of some £S.10 million must be conserved to meet development expenditure and should not be drawn upon to meet the budgetary deficit. In order therefore to bridge the deficit and possibly achieve a small surplus, the Government had decided to introduce a compulsory saving scheme for all Sudanese Government employees and also to impose certain increases in taxation.

⁽¹⁾ Enclosures not printed.

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7. The second problem was the decline in foreign exchange reserves. The total amount of foreign exchange earned during the next nine months would not be sufficient to meet the demand for imports at 1957 levels, whereas under present circumstances it was essential to see that the country does not in any one year spend more than it earns, or more than it had saved in foreign exchange during the previous years. The Government would therefore confine development expenditure to the most urgent and vital needs, and would also attempt to influence private investment and development expenditure in order to contain it within reasonable limits.

8. The Minister observed that the Government was faced with a dilemma in the solution of the third main problem. This was the effect of the fall in earnings and incomes on economic activity and the level of employment. To meet this problem the Government should maintain its development activities, whereas the previous considerations showed that this was not possible within the country's present resources. The Government had therefore decided that, while reducing development requirements, it should seek external assistance and loans for financing certain development projects. In this connection, the Minister made specific reference to the anticipated World Bank loan for railway development and expressed the hope that a loan would also be forthcoming from the same source for major irrigation and agricultural schemes (an obvious reference to the Roseires Dam and Managil Extension projects).

9. Revenue calculations were based on the assumption that all available cotton would be sold during the budgetary year, but if this did not happen, the whole position would change; similarly the success of efforts to secure external financing for part of the development programme would enable further projects to be undertaken. The financial situation would accordingly be kept under constant review, and another budget might be introduced later in the year.

10. After quoting a passage from the Report of the World Bank Mission to demonstrate the soundness of the Government's long-term financial policy, the Minister announced that it had again been found necessary to defer the publication of a five-year development plan. He added, however, that the greatest emphasis in this plan when produced would be placed on the development of alternative cash crops and on mineral and industrial development.

11. The Minister described the proposed changes in taxation as detailed in the Finance Bill 1958, which it is estimated will result in an increase in revenue of £5.34 million in a full year. These changes take effect immediately. Sayed Ibrahim explained that he had not proposed any changes in the Business Profits Tax because of his intention to present before the end of the year a Bill for the introduction of income tax and the reform of some existing taxes.

12. After a further reference to the Compulsory Savings Scheme for Government officials, the Minister concluded with a plea for the Government and people to pull together in the present time of financial stringency. He called for a general recognition of the fact that the Sudan is facing a difficult year, comparable with conditions in the early thirties, which must be met by a willingness to sacrifice.

13. It was well known before the budget speech that the country was facing a period of financial difficulty and a "tighten the belts" budget was fully anticipated. The country was thus prepared to hear of unpleasant measures, and this possibly accounts in large measure for the comparatively friendly reception Sayed Ibrahim's proposals have received. Full credit must, however, also be given to the Minister for a concise and clear statement of the Government's aims and proposals. The manner of Sayed Ibrahim's speech was well designed to disarm criticism and, in presenting his third and most difficult budget, the Minister has still further enhanced his reputation.

14. The budget has in general been well received in the Sudanese Press, and newspapers which are hostile to the Government have had difficulty in finding a suitable focus for attack. There have been some demonstrations by Government employees against the Compulsory Savings proposals, but in general it is appreciated that this scheme is better than cuts in wages.

15. In the debate in the House of Representatives the Opposition attack lacked coherence. In that there was any dominant Opposition theme it was to show

the budget as a "rich man's budget", but the Opposition could find little to quarrel with in the proposals put forward, and the budget was accordingly given an unopposed second reading on the 4th of June.

16. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Development Division at Beirut, Political Office, Middle East Forces, Her Majesty's Ambassador at Washington, the Governor of Kenya and Uganda, Commercial Relations and Exports Department of the Board of Trade and Export Credits Guarantee Department.

I have, &c.

A. G. HAYDON

(for the Ambassador).

JS 11345/5

No. 8

PASSAGE OF THE AMERICAN AID BILL

Sir Edwin Chapman-Andrews to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received July 21)(No. 74. Confidential)
Sir,Khartoum,
July 19, 1958.

With reference to Sir Edwin Chapman-Andrews' telegrams No. 823 of the 3rd of July and No. 37 S of the 4th of July, reporting the passage of the American Aid Bill through the House of Representatives. I have the honour to inform you that on the 7th of July, the Bill was passed at its third reading in the House by 101 votes to 49. It has also passed through all three stages in the Senate, the voting being 30 to 13.

2. The text, together with that of a letter from the Sudanese Minister for Foreign Affairs to the United States Ambassador, dated the 1st of July, is annexed.⁽¹⁾

3. As reported in the telegrams, it was clear from the beginning that the introduction of the Bill into Parliament would meet with opposition from the N.U.P., and, more important still, within the Government coalition from Sayed Ali Abdel Rahman and his group. The Umma Party itself was known to be solidly behind the Prime Minister and the position of the Southern M.Ps. was that some, led by Stanislaus Paysama, were expected to vote against the Bill, while others under the wing of Father Saturnino might be won over to the Government side.

4. The situation just before the debate, when there was intensive lobbying by all parties, was therefore critical for the Government and indeed their continuance in office seemed to hinge largely on

(a) how many members of the P.D.P. would follow Sayed Ali Abdel Rahman, and

(b) how many Southerners would follow Stanislaus Paysama.

5. A major complication was that the American offer lapsed at the end of June and was not renewable without the United States Senate's approval. Moreover, the four-day Eid began on the 26th of June, the day after the debate was due to start. The successful passage of the Bill was therefore a matter of urgency.

6. The debate opened on the 26th of June, and it was confidently expected it would be passed that day. But as you will have seen from Khartoum telegrams Nos. 788, 791 and 795 of the 25th, 26th and 27th of June respectively, it was adjourned to enable time for further consultations between the Government parties. However, during the course of the debate, which began light-heartedly enough, Ali Abdel Rahman appeared dramatically and the whole tone changed. There were hasty consultations and even though it was clear they had a majority, the Government disengaged by proposing an adjournment. It was Sayed Siddiq's decision in his capacity as Chairman of the Umma Party and apparently taken over the head of the Prime Minister in order to give time to the P.D.P. to unite. Sayed Siddiq was afraid that were a public split to occur in the P.D.P., this might set a precedent in the Constitutional Committee, where in the opinion of many members a two-thirds and not a simple majority is required. This is one of the questions on which the Sudanese Parliamentary Leaders are consulting with Sir Ivor Jennings.

7. Over the long Bairam week-end a great deal of manoeuvring went on. Finally the Ali Abdel Rahman wing of the P.D.P. announced they would support the American Aid Bill provided certain clarifications were made. These are set out in a letter from the Foreign Minister to the United States Ambassador annexed herewith.⁽¹⁾

8. The letter stipulates that aid which the Sudan Government will receive is to be confined to four heads; Rural Water Development; Roads; Agricultural

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

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Development; Technical Education and related matters. The most significant proviso in the letter (see penultimate paragraph) is that which states that the words in the Introduction and in Clause 1 of the Bill "and related assistance" shall be regarded as covering the four heads referred to above. In other words, the Sudan Government have rejected aid which, it was originally intended, would cover communications, radio and the construction of air strips. These are of course the very heads under which American aid would have served to strengthen the defence of the country.

9. When the Bill came to be debated on the 3rd of July, the Opposition took the line that as no reply had as then been received from the American Government, the agreement was not complete and therefore was not ready constitutionally for consideration by Parliament. This was a good debating point, but an amendment to this effect was defeated. The Bill was then passed by the substantial majority recorded above.

10. I am sending a copy of this despatch with enclosures to Washington.

I have, &c.

R. W. BAILEY

(for Her Majesty's Ambassador).

Note.—Sudanese Press reports stated that the Bill was approved by the Supreme Commission on the 22nd of July, 1958.

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JS 1015/166

No. 9

POLITICAL SITUATION IN THE SUDAN

Sir Edwin Chapman-Andrews to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received December 1)

(No. 99. Confidential)

Khartoum,

Sir,

November 25, 1958.

My telegrams and letters to the Department during the past four weeks have described the political situation existing here before the *coup d'état* by the Sudanese Army on the 17th of November, the *coup* itself and the total absence of any reaction, so far, throughout the Sudan. In this despatch I have the honour to offer some comments on what the Minister for Foreign Affairs officially describes as the "new set-up", together with some observations on the causes and significance of recent events; and possible future developments.

2. Before starting this exercise, however, I wish to mention the name of my Military Attaché, Colonel M. F. V. Willoughby, whose report to me of the 4th of November, describing the atmosphere at Sudanese Army Headquarters, left no doubt about what was brewing. The possibility of a *coup d'état* of some sort had, as the Department are aware, been in the air for some considerable time and the topic was being widely discussed as one of moment in political circles in the early days of November; but Colonel Willoughby's report enabled me to focus clearly and get the range of coming events with some accuracy.

3. In fact, it may be said that seldom, if ever, has an army *coup d'état* succeeded so well after being so accurately signalled in advance. The reason for this is significant; the entire General Staff of the army were in it. This was no daring murderous conspiracy by a handful of desperadoes, but a regular straightforward military operation planned by the General Staff in daylight. All 13 senior army officers, the Kaid and Deputy Kaid, G.I. Ops., the C.O. of Khartoum Garrison, the C.O. Artillery, the C.O. Armoured Regiment, the O.C. Infantry Training School, the O.C. Service Corps, A & Q, the Corps Commanders at El Obeid, Fasher, Atbara and Juba, all are in "The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces". These jointly exercise the sovereign power, having supplanted "The Supreme Commission" of five civilians. But unlike the latter, whose Chairman was by monthly rota, the Kaid is President of the Council, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and Prime Minister. With the old Supreme Council has gone "the Sudan Transitional Constitution" which created it.

"We the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives, sitting in a joint session of our Parliament, do hereby resolve to adopt the sub-joined provisions as the Transitional Constitution of the Sudan, to be upheld and to be obeyed by the people of the Sudan until other provision is, in due course, made." (No. 2390 of 1955.)

"Other provision" has indeed now been made, though not of the kind envisaged in 1955. Nevertheless, Constitutional Order No. 1 of the 18th of November, 1958, ordains as follows:

- (a) The Sudan is a democratic republic. Sovereignty is vested in the people . . .
- (b) The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces is the highest constitutional authority in the country.
- (c) The Supreme Council delegates to its President all constitutional, judicial and executive powers, as well as command of the Armed Forces.

(Signed) IBRAHIM ABBOD,
 President of the Supreme Council "

Yet another interpretation of "democracy": *ex Africa semper aliquid novi*.

4. In discussing the political possibilities beforehand with my Western colleagues, some interesting differences of viewpoint were revealed. My United States colleague wanted a Government under Abdullah Khalil, formed from the most reliable elements in all the parties, but he was not prepared to press and was

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pessimistic of success. He wanted Abdullah Khalil to stay at almost any price. My French colleague wanted the N.U.P. in the Government at any price, preferably under anyone but Abdullah Khalil, whom he regarded as having proved conclusively his incapacity to govern. He was categorically opposed to a *coup*, which he thought would be "disastrous". Like the Americans we British wanted a more broadly-based Government but, unlike them, were prepared to say so. In particular, on instructions, I encouraged Abdullah Khalil to negotiate with the N.U.P. for the formation of a more broadly-based coalition Government and I counselled him most seriously against the dangers of an unconstitutional act of force. I think it fair to say that in our judgment the parliamentary situation had not yet deteriorated beyond remedy. The Ethiopian Ambassador, newly returned from Addis Ababa, where he had been present at secret interviews between the Emperor and Abdullah Khalil, was very strongly against the *coup*. He told me that the Emperor had left Abdullah in no doubt about his wish not to have an Arab military dictatorship on his very doorstep. The Turk, on the other hand, though characteristically he had received no guidance from his Government, was among those who thought that an army *coup* was inevitable and that it was the least dangerous of the courses open.

5. The Sudanese themselves were naturally divided. Mubarak Zarroug, Leader of the Parliamentary Opposition, told me on the 12th of November that he thought a *coup* possible, but that if it occurred "it would be the end of the Umma as a party". On the 10th of November, I was with others invited to breakfast by Judge Shingeiti. In conversation before the arrival of the Prime Minister and Mahjoub, Shingeiti spoke philosophically about the unsuitability of the parliamentary régime for countries like the Sudan. As the first Speaker of the Legislative Assembly when it was set up in 1948, as a distinguished jurist and as Speaker of the present House of Representatives, he had become a real authority on parliamentary procedure. He admitted that when Parliament was sitting the procedure went like clockwork and that the general elections had been carried through with the same precision. Shaking his head sadly, however, he agreed with another Sudanese who said that Western democracy in the Sudan meant little outside a radius of five miles of the Houses of Parliament. Even the Lord Chief Justice, an Anglophile if ever there was one, did not conceal from me in a private conversation on the 28th of October his fears lest attempts to govern by another combination of existing party leaders should fail and lead to public disorders. He longed for a Government that would govern and he regretted the passing of the Condominium.

6. The Khartoum Press, as was to be expected where nearly all the editors and journalists were in Egyptian or Communist pay, was almost unanimous in its daily slanderous attacks upon the Umma Party, the Americans and ourselves. For the past two years or more, the aim and object of the Egyptians and Communists has clearly been to weaken the Umma. They had now succeeded to the point where they might expect to lay the Umma low within a few days of the reassembly of Parliament.

7. In his radio broadcast on the morning of the *coup*, General Abboud spoke at length about corruption in political life: corruption had led to chaos. That was the army's justification. The Mahdi enlarged upon the same subject, but added that corruption had threatened the very independence of the country. The army's action, therefore, was in defence of independence. True it is, moreover, that the ultimate breakdown of the parliamentary system was assured from the day when Egyptian bribery first got to work among parliamentary candidates and electors. From that moment onwards, no party could face a general election with any hope of holding its own, let alone succeeding, unless it disposed of enormous secret funds. It has been calculated, for example, that the Mahdi spent £300,000 on the elections last February. This doubled the strength of his party in Parliament, but did not secure an absolute majority. Inconclusive and therefore unsatisfactory as the results of the last elections were, there was no hope of holding new ones if only because they were "too expensive". This was the deep-seated primary cause of the *coup*, namely the near breakdown of the party system through corruption started, years ago, by Egypt. Party chests were empty.

8. For this in turn the economic situation was also to blame. The Sudanese economy is a one crop one: cotton. An average crop would be, say, 400,000 bales. In the Sudan to-day, unsold stocks accumulated over two years, amount to over

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250,000 bales; and the new crop, a bumper one from all accounts, will be in by March. With nearly £15 million worth of cotton unsold, the country had an adverse trade balance of nearly £12 million for the first nine months of this year. Reserves of foreign currency are right down: development budgets right up. As a result, a strict import licensing system is in force and the Sudan is on a pinching austerity basis. For this, Abdullah Khalil, as Prime Minister, must take the blame. He has failed to impose himself on the Minister of Finance and through him on the Gezira Board. Sudanese reserve prices have again, as last year, been consistently too high. Discussion, indecision and postponement have taken the place of action, on a falling market. This was the second cause of the *coup*. In cotton marketing policy, as in policies generally, the Umma have been too rigid, too self-confident and too late.

9. Abdullah Khalil and the Umma leaders have been urged by friendly outsiders, including myself, since the result of the February elections first became known, to negotiate with the N.U.P. with a view to forming a more broadly-based Government that would have a national character. Abdullah Khalil grudgingly agreed in principle, but in fact did little or nothing. On the 12th of November, the Leader of the Opposition told me that he did not believe the Umma ever meant its approach seriously. The plain truth is that the Umma do not trust the N.U.P. Abdullah Khalil in particular does not trust Azhari. The countryman does not trust the townsman. The soldier does not trust the politician. The farmer does not trust the university graduate. And, unfortunately, Azhari, an opportunist by nature, has one fatal weakness. He cannot whenever travelling abroad resist the temptation to please his hosts, by saying what he thinks they yearn to hear. He has given many lamentable exhibitions of this weakness in Cairo during the past three years. To it is due the unexpectedly good impression he made during his visit to London in 1954. Those who know him plead that such things have little significance for Azhari and none for the N.U.P.; but they do not inspire confidence in Azhari's trustworthiness. This was the third cause of the *coup*, namely the unlikelihood, through mistrust of Azhari, of an Umma-N.U.P. coalition succeeding in practice even if it could be formed at all.

10. The fourth underlying cause was S.A.R.'s clumsy management, for which his failing health must be the explanation, both of the Umma Party (where Siddiq El Mahdi and Abdullah Khalil were more often than not at loggerheads) and of his candidature for the Presidency of the Republic. This supreme office could not be filled until it had been created and only a permanent Constitution could do that. The February elections were as much for a Constituent Assembly as for a Legislature and the all-party Constitution Committee had, by mid-October, come to a dead end. It could not even meet for lack of a quorum. The Mahdi wanted to have it all ways. He was to be President and his son was to succeed him. His nominee was also to be Prime Minister. The N.U.P. would be sufficiently rewarded by being allowed into the Government at all. No political concessions were to be made to the Southerners (who in any case wanted a Supreme Commission with a Southerner on it); their votes could be bought, if only someone would lend him the money. Even his agreement with S.A.M., based upon the latter's support of "S.A.R. for President", finally failed to stand the strain and the P.D.P. came out with an official statement in favour of a Five-man Supreme Commission. If S.A.R. had been prepared to forgo his candidature for the Presidency, there would have been a much better chance of all the parties coming together and agreeing upon a draft Constitution early in the life of the present Parliament and hence a better chance of an effective National Government. As things were, there was no draft Constitution and therefore no point in holding a meeting of the Constituent Assembly. That being so, there seemed no point in holding another meeting of Parliament. For this, one must hold S.A.R. himself and the policy of the Umma Party under its President, Sayed Siddiq, largely responsible. When Sayed Siddiq did come round to negotiating with the N.U.P. it was too late and his differences with Abdullah had already ensured that Abdullah's heart was not in it.

11. Some people believe that Abdullah Khalil himself engineered this *coup* because of his passion for power. These are of the opinion that he would never agree to a coalition with the N.U.P. because he knew it would entail his eventual overthrow. This is possible but I personally do not believe it. My opinion is that Abdullah is a patriot who genuinely believes that Sudanese independence is safe only with the Umma—or the army—in charge.

12. Whether or not Abdullah in fact instigated the *coup* is a question everybody is asking. He himself has confessed privately that he was in the plot months ago and he has made public his belief that without the *coup* the Sudan would have lost its independence. My own opinion is that as Minister of Defence he ordered the army to plan a take-over as an exercise. At the time of Suez, this was a prudent precaution. When, a year later, the Egyptians seemed to threaten the Sudanese Northern frontier, the take-over plans would have been brought up to date. They would again be refurbished during the unrest which followed the army *coup* in Baghdad. The more the army went through the drill on paper, the easier it must have seemed. In fact my belief is that this army take-over was first conceived as a constitutional act during a state of emergency, following a Proclamation by the Supreme Commission under the Transitional Constitution. The first Proclamations of the Kaid on the 17th of November bear this out. They cite the Sudan Defence Ordinances promulgated by the Governor-General during the Condominium régime, and amended after independence by the substitution of "Supreme Commission" for "Governor-General" and "Minister of the Interior" for "Advocate-General". General Abboud had obviously hastily amended them again by substituting himself for both. An attempt was made to put matters right juridically by formal "Constitution Orders" next day.

13. Reviewing the political situation on the eve of the crisis, my United States colleague and I agreed that all three Northern parties were split, having members on either side of the fence. To convene Parliament for a session in which Azhari's intention, publicly declared in Cairo, was to defeat the Government, annul American aid, reject the British gift of arms, and conclude a defence pact with Egypt, would have been to run grave risks indeed. Even so, Abdullah Khalil could have withstood the attack if he could have counted on the loyalty of the junior partner in his existing coalition. He could conceivably have continued to rent the loyalty of his Southern supporters and have coerced his wavering Northerners; but there was no means of ensuring the loyalty of the ideological Ali Abdel Rahman, President of the P.D.P. Like many Khatmia of the old school, he wanted the strongest possible links with Cairo; and this was the crux of the whole matter. He had threatened to cross the floor of the House over the American Aid Bill last July and in the meanwhile he had won over other members of his party to a policy of whittling down the aid which they had reluctantly agreed to then. Moreover, his party agents at rallies in the country were passing resolutions condemning American aid and the Government, and proclaiming political aims indistinguishable from those of the Communists themselves. Finally, when Abdullah Khalil returned to Khartoum from Addis Ababa on the 7th of November, it was to discover that Ali Abdel Rahman had left for Cairo without his permission; and that Azhari with a strong N.U.P. delegation were there also. Egyptian Press reports told of lengthy talks with Nasser. This at a time when Nasser was sending messages to the Mahdi and to Abdullah Khalil expressing his readiness to meet the latter at any time to discuss outstanding differences. Abdullah doubtless felt, as I did, that these messages were a ruse, a holding operation, to gain time until Parliament could meet and Abdullah's downfall be compassed therein. In a discussion with me on the 12th of November, Abdullah did not conceal his mistrust of Nasser. He spoke of his haunting fear that a pro-Egyptian Sudanese Government would one day appeal in a crisis for Egyptian military assistance. The Deputy Kaid spoke in similar terms to a member of my staff on the 6th of November.

14. These fears, moreover, may not have been imaginary. The course of events could easily have been as follows. On the 17th of November, Parliament would have reassembled and, efforts to come to terms with the N.U.P. having failed, Abdullah Khalil would have asked for and obtained a vote of confidence with the support of the P.D.P. and the "rented" Southerners. Then suddenly, a few days later, on some question of foreign policy which divided the Arab world, such as American economic or British military aid (probably the latter), Abdullah would have been defeated and Ali Abdel Rahman given an immediate vote of confidence with the support of a majority of the N.U.P. and P.D.P., a substantial number of bribed Southerners and even a few dissident Umma members. On the defeat of Abdullah, there would have been violent demonstrations by the Ansar, creating a situation in which the army would have had to intervene. Simultaneously, Ali Abdel Rahman as Prime Minister would have appealed to Cairo for help. On this Nasser would have acted, as we and the Americans acted in not dissimilar circumstances in response to the appeals from Jordan and Lebanon.

And the crisis might well have coincided with the much advertised visit (now postponed) of the Soviet Trade Mission.

15. Whatever the reason why the army acted on the 17th of November, there can be no doubt that the *coup* itself was a purely Sudanese affair devoid of foreign influence. My opinion is that Abdullah Khalil originally instigated it and gave orders before leaving Addis Ababa on the 29th of October that the army was to be ready to move on the 17th of November. On his return to Khartoum on the 7th of November, it is possible that he would have preferred to give way before the advice of the Emperor of Ethiopia and other friends and to have tried to form a National Government; but, surprised and alarmed by the unauthorised excursion of Ali Abdel Rahman to Cairo and by reports of Nasser's conversations there with Azhari and the N.U.P. leaders also, he decided to let matters take their course. By this time the army were eager to act and if Abdullah had tried to stop them he would have failed and, more important for the future, lost their confidence.

16. By 4 a.m. on the morning of the 17th of November, the day on which Parliament was to have reassembled (though the Speakers had postponed it to the 8th of December a bare 24 hours earlier) troops had noiselessly taken up their allotted positions throughout the capital. Armed guards were placed on the Parliament buildings, Government offices, the Palace and residences of the Supreme Commission, the Chanceries of Embassies and Legations (but not the private houses of Heads of Mission), the houses of the Presidents of the political parties, and on the banks. Machine-gun posts were set up at bridges and strategic points in the three towns. Reserves of troops were known to be encamped outside the perimeter. The high officers of Parliament (including the Speaker), members of the Government, leaders of the Opposition and certain other Sudanese were personally informed by army officers, with the Kaid's compliments, that they must stay indoors until further orders. Radio Omdurman began at dawn to announce that an important statement would be made by the Kaid at 7.30 a.m. Sudanese military music was played on gramophone records during the intervals. At 7.30 a.m., the Kaid read his statement. This was of a re-assuring nature, guaranteeing in particular the lives and property of foreigners. It called upon all Sudanese to go quietly on with their normal work. All political parties were abolished: Parliament was dissolved: demonstrations forbidden and newspapers suspended. In the course of the morning, an army officer called at the Chancery of this Embassy and stated that wireless transmissions should cease. Later I was informed by the Protocol Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that messages in plain language were allowed. All these restrictions were gradually lifted, apart from the ban on demonstrations, in the course of the next few days: and by the end of the week no troops were to be seen anywhere in the capital. The newspapers were appearing again, their various political angles still discernible, though softened. The *coup* was an accomplished fact and there had been no resistance of any sort anywhere. On the other hand, there was no outburst of public satisfaction. The man in the street seemed interested, though slightly astonished. The few individuals I spoke to seemed hopeful that it might mean better times, cheaper food and lower rents anyway. The Sudanese are by nature a disciplined people.

17. Once the deed was done, hundreds of congratulatory telegrams poured into army headquarters from all over the Sudan. The two Sayeds gave the movement their blessing, S.A.M. briefly, with pious hopes that all would be for the best, and S.A.R. at some length with heavy emphasis on defending the country's independence. Even Ali Abdel Rahman, who had arrived from Cairo at Khartoum Airport in the small hours of the 17th to find a corporal and two men awaiting him, made a brief public statement a day or two later. Nureddin, another P.D.P. leader and in his time more corrupt than any of them, made some fulsome remarks deprecating corruption. The N.U.P. remained silent, but we know they are extremely annoyed by the turn of events. In private conversation, the Umma old guard applauded, while the main body of the P.D.P. uncomplainingly acquiesced. Shingeiti, former Speaker, has privately welcomed it as the only safe way out for the Sudan. The first move of Sayed Siddiq, who was in Rome when the news broke, was to cancel his air booking for return to Khartoum that day. Only later, after receiving a reassuring message, did he venture back and on arrival he publicly applauded the army's action. The Ansar as such have said nothing. Some of the younger Umma Members of Parliament and relatives of the Mahdi have in

private expressed some misgivings about the wisdom of a move which they feel has eclipsed the Umma and the Ansar. They complain that the members of the Supreme Council of the Army and the Government are largely Khatmia by family affiliation.

18. The question therefore arises how long this set-up will last. The Kaid himself has admitted to me that he is expecting a counter-attack, though he does not know whence, when or how it will come. The former Ministers, ex-Ministers and Members of Parliament are dispersing to their homes scattered throughout the country. Deprived of their parliamentary salaries, baulked of their hopes of preferment, promotion and extraneous pecuniary benefits, they will not forever remain contented, peaceful and obedient citizens under this new form of military dictatorship. The new Government, totally inexperienced, does not inspire confidence. The N.U.P. learned how to work underground during the Condominium and they will doubtless look up their old records. The trade unions in this country are better organised and composed of more resolute members than elsewhere in the Arab world. A threatened general strike used to worry the Governor-General more almost than anything. Trade unions are in fact capable of bringing this country, a million square miles in extent, with its tenuous railway and almost non-existent road communications, to a standstill. A high percentage of the school teachers are Egyptian and the great majority of the inhabitants of all the towns favour the N.U.P. or the P.D.P. The army is comparatively small, perhaps 17,000 all told. The 13 senior officers will have other cares than the troops under their command and some of the most important ones behind the *coup*, such as the Deputy Kaid, now hold Government portfolios which will take up all their time and more. It is only to be expected that these senior officers will gradually lose touch with the Company Commanders and it is these that form the real backbone of the army. Many of them are known to be restive and indeed General Ahmed Abdel Wahab has publicly stated that this was one of the reasons why the High Command decided to act. They had to act because the army demanded it. This is strange doctrine from a soldier. It is indistinguishable from that of the demagogue who has to follow the crowd in the street in order to retain his leadership. To my mind it bodes ill for the future.

19. My French colleague is of the opinion that the present set-up cannot last a month unless they bring more politicians, men who know the business of government, into the Administration. There seems to me, however, to be little chance of any such changes being made for some time. A close relative of the Mahdi told me at breakfast on the morning of the *coup* that the idea was to hand over to politicians in about six months' time, after the army had cleaned the place up. The Kaid himself has spoken of handing over in due course, though he has mentioned a year or two's time. He is known to be considering the creation of some new electoral system; also the establishment of expert committees to run various sides of State activity, such as commercial, economic, financial, education. As yet, however, this is for the future. I personally much doubt whether we shall ever again see anything in the Sudan resembling the old Parliament. In a sense this *coup* is a step along the road of Sudanese independence. It is something they have done themselves; not something left to them by the British, as Parliament was. On the other hand, it is a step backwards, for the new régime resembles nothing so much as that of the Governor-General under the Condominium. Whichever way we look at it, we have to admit that the parliamentary system (which was introduced here only 10 years ago and has had less than 10 years of full life, for during the first few years of that period the elections were boycotted by the N.U.P. and by a large section of the Khatmia) was a foreign importation. It was trusted by the Sudanese because it was British. They believed that because it was British it must be good and would work. They soon perceived its value as providing a forum for the debate of public issues, but they were not tough enough to take the strain which the real responsibilities of parliamentary government imposed upon them. It was merely a debating society. Many individuals, including Abdullah Khalil, were too old to learn. They could not accustom themselves to the discipline of publicly explaining and defending their actions in reply to questions from people for whom they had no respect. Their nature was to command and to obey, not to justify and explain. Hence there can be no doubt that for the great majority of the older generation a military régime appears the most suitable one for this country. This, however, does not apply to the younger generation. They will be served; and though for a time I expect the country to give the army a chance and see how they get on, I have little

doubt that before long the challenge will come. It will come from within the Sudan. It may come from the junior commissioned ranks of the army or from the trade unions or from both together. It may be voiced at the appropriate moment by some of the politicians now unemployed. The danger is that it may be taken advantage of, when it does come, by Egypt. For the failure of parliamentary democracy in the Sudan means a defeat, of a sort, for the West. We and the Sudanese who tried to make the system work have been driven out of a position which we are not likely to recapture. The new military Government here is unlike its counterparts in Cairo and Baghdad only in that it is not in essence a revolutionary Government. It is governed by an Army Council instead of by a Council of Ministers. The Army Council is the same as it was before the *coup* occurred. As many Sudanese have assured me, "nothing has changed", but in fact a great deal has changed. For the time being it may have changed for the better. Certainly the Army High Command are friendly towards the West and particularly towards Britain. They have all been trained by British officers and most of them have been on senior officers' courses in England. Britain has just made a most generous gift of arms to them and of training facilities. They know us and have known us for years and they are grateful to us. So long as they remain in power I have every hope that our policies, and Western policies generally in this country, will not suffer an eclipse. On the contrary. My only misgiving is as to the future: and I hope my fears may prove unfounded. There is nothing we can do about them except employ our best efforts to keep the Government and the country generally in the Western camp, developing as rapidly as possible on sound economic, political and broadly social lines.

20. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassadors at Washington, Paris, Addis Ababa and Benghazi, to the Political Office, Middle East Forces, to Beirut (for the Regional Information Officer), and to the Governors of Kenya, Uganda, Aden and Somaliland.

I have, &c.

E. A. CHAPMAN-ANDREWS.

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

JS 1902/1

No. 10

SUDAN: HEADS OF FOREIGN MISSIONS, 1958

Sir Edwin Chapman-Andrews to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received November 14)

(No. 95. Confidential) *Khartoum,*
Sir, *November 11, 1958.*

I have the honour to submit herewith my Report on Heads of Foreign Missions in Khartoum for 1958.

I have, &c.

E. A. CHAPMAN-ANDREWS.

Enclosure

(Passages marked with an asterisk are reproduced from previous reports.)

Belgium

M. Jean Nieuwenhuys, Ambassador. (Appointed July 23, 1956.)

*An excellent Western colleague, friendly, reliable and co-operative. Formerly Consul-General in Jerusalem, and for several years Counsellor at the Embassy in London.

Has an agreeable English wife. No children. (Written in 1956.)

Czechoslovakia

M. Josef Pospisil, Minister. (Appointed November 26, 1956.)

*Undistinguished, but speaks fair English, and is quite affable. His wife, who was a language teacher, speaks English also. One daughter, in Prague. (Written in 1956.)

Ethiopia

Ato Mellas Andom, Ambassador. (Appointed June 27, 1956.)

*Of Tigrean origin, brought as a child to Khartoum with his family as refugees in 1936, he was educated in Khartoum and is on intimate terms with many Sudanese, especially members of the Umma Party. Speaks excellent Arabic and good English.

He has an extensive knowledge of Sudanese political life. Anti-Nasser, anti-Communist, perspicacious, no colour complex; a good diplomatist, friendly and presentable. A useful and agreeable colleague. Unmarried. (Written in 1956.)

France

M. Christian Auboyneau, Ambassador. (Appointed April 26, 1956.)

*One of the Gaullist entry into the French Foreign Service after the war, during which he escaped from Occupied France and served with the Free French Commando forces. Was wounded and lost an eye in the landing in the South of France. Of a French naval family, his brother, a K.C.B., commanded the French Naval Forces supporting the Normandy landings.

He is an affable, co-operative and agreeable colleague. A terrific individualist, *un numéro*,

impatient and bursting with energy, unmethodical and unpredictable, he makes great demands upon his staff, who seem to be driven to distraction by him. An arrogance which is absent from his intercourse with his diplomatic colleagues seems also to have annoyed some local business people, but the latter as a class in Khartoum tend to be mediocre, smug and rather above themselves.

His wife, who is rarely here, is an extremely able woman. She is an expert in horticulture and runs a successful business connected therewith in Paris. She remained in Occupied France through the war, and was afterwards commended for her work with the Underground movement. They have one son, a journalist, aged about 30. (Written in 1956.)

Federal Republic of Germany

Herr Heinrich de Haas, Minister. (Appointed September 27, 1956.)

*Born in 1896. Came to Khartoum as Liaison Officer in July 1955. Well informed, effective and zealous in promoting German commercial interests, in which field, although at first without any staff, he achieved single-handed more than many larger Missions. He keeps an especially vigilant eye on Communism. Speaks excellent English, having been born in Australia and educated at Sydney Grammar School. Was in the German Consular Service under the Nazis. Agreeable, friendly and co-operative. (Written in 1956.) Has a German wife, much younger than himself who often solves *The Times* crossword.

Greece

Mr. P. Calogeras, Chargé d'Affaires. (Appointed January 28, 1956.)

*A comparatively junior member of the Greek Foreign Service, he has, with the help of some members of the Hellenic community, the largest foreign community in the Sudan, organised some effective propaganda over the Cyprus question, but does not seem fanatical. Personally presentable and friendly, but somewhat pompous, attaching great importance to diplomatic convention and protocol, having been for a time in charge of the Protocol Department in Athens. Speaks good English and claims to have been on the staff of the King of the Hellenes in exile during the war. Knows London well.

Has a decorative young German wife, who speaks English. (Written in 1956.)

Iraq

Sayed Hashim Khalil, Minister. (Appointed February 24, 1958.)

A most friendly and helpful pro-Western Iraqi, aged about 40, with a suitable wife and one or two infant children. A regular member of the Diplomatic Services, he has been retained here despite the recent *coup d'état* in Baghdad. Does not disguise his antipathy towards the Egyptians or his hostility to Communism.

Italy

Baron Paolo Tallarigo Di Zagarise E. Sarsale, Minister. (Appointed February 10, 1958.)

A friendly colleague of nearly 60, with a lady-like wife and a grown-up family. A married daughter has settled in Nyasaland. Baron and Baroness on their visiting cards, they like so to be addressed. He has the genuine touch of the Italian professional diplomatist and has been helpful in contacts with the local Roman Catholic authorities (Italian) and with Catholic Southerners (Sudanese), but is chary of becoming officially involved. He is a little over-sensitive, lacking robustness generally.

Netherlands

In the hands of a junior as Chargé d'Affaires *sur pied*.

Saudi Arabia

Sheikh Abdel Rahman El Helaissi, Ambassador. (Appointed September 18, 1957.)

*Called on me despite the severance of diplomatic relations. Served for nine years in the Saudi Embassy in London. Speaks excellent English and is undoubtedly pro-Western. (Written in 1956.) Unfortunately not a strong character reputedly something of a philanderer. Of fair complexion (like some Syrians), but a Saudi born and bred. Was for a time Deputy Minister of Agriculture. Aspires to the Jordan Embassy.

Turkey

Semsettin Arif Mardin, Ambassador. (Appointed August 25, 1957.)

A professional diplomatist in the middle fifties with a grown-up son who is a university teacher. A political liberal. Both he and his wife (who has some German blood) are of the Ottoman aristocracy with long family records of political and military services. Both speak excellent English and French and sufficient colloquial Arabic. They know all the gossip about Diplomatic Corps colleagues past and present. His last post was Chef de Protocole at Ankara and before that Santiago. He is a most friendly and helpful colleague, with a gentle personality but sure touch.

United Arab Republic

Major-General Mohmoud Seif Al Yazal Khalifa Ambassador (originally of Egypt). (Appointed January 4, 1956.)

*Aged about 50 and obviously, like his wife, of "Western" or "Turkish" origin, fair complexioned. Born at Wadi Halfa (Sudan), son of an Army officer. Speaks and writes excellent English and knows England well. Was openly friendly towards us before Suez; has behaved correctly since. No previous knowledge or experience of diplomacy. Incurred the displeasure of Abdulla Khalil's Government for "interference in Sudanese affairs," but this is, in my opinion, due to activities of members of his staff acting on orders received directly from Cairo. His wife seldom if ever appears. There are several children, the eldest of whom, a girl of about 20, (recently married and now living in Cairo) speaks English perfectly. (Written in 1956.)

United States of America

Mr. James S. Moose, Jr., Ambassador. (Appointed March 17, 1958.)

A friendly and co-operative colleague with a suitable American wife and a teenage family. A creditable Arabist with previous service as Head of Mission in Jedda and Damascus.

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

M. Leonid F. Teplov, Ambassador. (Appointed April 30, 1956.)

*Easy in conversation and speaks fairly good English, having served for some years in Ottawa. Was for a time Chef de Protocole in Moscow. Does not seem high-powered, but is active behind the scenes, his house and garden, though devoid of Sudanese servants, being a popular rendezvous for numbers of Sudanese not seen in diplomatic or political "society." (Written in 1956.)

Yemen

Sayed Saleh Ahmed Al Masri, Chargé d'Affaires *a.i.* (Appointed April 5, 1956.)

*Speaks no English. Not trusted or liked by anybody so far as we can see. (Written in 1956.)

Yugoslavia

M. Zivadin Simic, Minister. (Appointed September 24, 1958, having been promoted from Chargé d'Affaires, which post he had held from September 1956.)

*Very agreeable in conversation. It is hard to see what he finds to do here.

Has a pleasant wife. Both speak fair English. (Written in 1956.)

Heads of Mission Resident Elsewhere**Albania**

M. Ulvi Lulo, Minister. (Appointed October 21, 1957.)

Resident in Cairo.

Austria

Mr. Erich P. Hochleitner, Chargé d'Affaires. (Appointed February 14, 1958.)

Resident in Cairo.

Bulgaria

M. Nicolas Garilov, Minister. (Appointed October 13, 1956.)

*Resident in Cairo. (Written in 1956.)

Denmark

M. Christian D. Holten Eggert, Minister. (Appointed May 8 1958.)

Resident in Cairo.

Hungary

M. Lajos Szijarto, Minister. (Appointed January 21, 1958.)

Resident in Cairo.

Indonesia

Mr. Mahmoud L. Latjuba, Minister. (Appointed March 10, 1957.)

Resident in Cairo. Did not call on me.

Japan

M. Yutoka Tsuchida, Minister. (Appointed May 5, 1957.)

Resident in Cairo. Affably inscrutable. Speaks English.

Lebanon

Sayed Khalil Taki El Din, Minister. (Appointed January 24, 1956.)

*Resident in Cairo. (Written in 1956.)

Norway

M. Christian Parhl Reusch, Minister. (Appointed January 27, 1958.)

Resident in Cairo.

Poland

M. Alexander Krajewski, Ambassador. (Appointed July 25, 1956.)

*Resident in Cairo. During his short visit here appeared friendly and far from being a fanatical Communist. The Embassy in Khartoum is in the charge of a M. Witold Skuratowicz (aged about 50) who, in an effort to unite the small Polish community, including the *émigrés*, has, together with his staff (and in the absence of Russian and satellite representatives) given indications of being very much a Pole first. His wife never moves from the circle of Communist wives at parties. (Written in 1956.) They have a son of about 10 who already speaks creditable English.

Roumania

M. Constantin Stanesco, Ambassador. (Appointed May 28, 1958.)

Resident in Cairo.

Spain

Don Jose del Castano y Cardona, Ambassador. (Appointed June 14, 1956.)

Resident in Cairo. Written in 1956.)

Sweden

Dr. Bjorn Axel Eyvind Bratt, Minister. (Appointed October 27, 1957.)

Resident in Addis Ababa.